Investor Overlap and Diffusion of Disclosure Practices by Jung, Michael J
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
Summer 8-13-2010
Investor Overlap and Diffusion of Disclosure
Practices
Michael J. Jung
University of Pennsylvania, mj.jung@yahoo.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Accounting Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/207
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jung, Michael J., "Investor Overlap and Diffusion of Disclosure Practices" (2010). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 207.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/207
Investor Overlap and Diffusion of Disclosure Practices
Abstract
This paper examines how one firm’s commitment to provide more public disclosure affects other firms’
disclosure practices in subsequent periods. I develop an investor demand-driven explanation for why and
when firms adopt the disclosure innovation of a first-mover firm. I test the hypothesis that overlap in
institutional ownership between two firms is a mechanism by which one firm’s greater disclosure creates
demand pressure for the other firm to follow. Using market risk disclosures as my empirical setting, I find that
a firm’s decision to follow a first-mover in providing more quantitative information in its 10-K filing than is
required by the SEC is positively associated with the level of, and changes in, institutional investor overlap. I
also find that the association is stronger for overlap among investors with greater influence over managers’
disclosure decisions, investors with incentives to demand public disclosure, and for firms whose investors are
most likely to demand expanded disclosure. Overall, this evidence provides new insight into patterns of intra-
industry disclosure behavior and highlights investor overlap as a source of variation in firms’ information
environments that can be used in future research.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Managerial Science and Applied Economics
First Advisor
Brian J. Bushee
Second Advisor
Catherine M. Schrand
Third Advisor
Robert W. Holthausen
Keywords
Disclosure, Institutional Investors, Investor Overlap, Diffusion
Subject Categories
Accounting
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/207
  
INVESTOR OVERLAP AND DIFFUSION OF DISCLOSURE PRACTICES 
Michael J. Jung 
 
A DISSERTATION 
In 
Accounting 
 
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2010 
 
__________________________________________ 
Brian J. Bushee, Supervisor of Dissertation 
 
__________________________________________ 
Eric T. Bradlow, Graduate Group Chairperson 
 
Dissertation Committee 
Brian J. Bushee, Associate Professor of Accounting 
Catherine M. Schrand, Professor of Accounting 
Robert W. Holthausen, Nomura Securities Professor of Accounting and Finance 
  
 
INVESTOR OVERLAP AND DIFFUSION OF DISCLOSURE PRACTICES 
COPYRIGHT 
2010 
Michael J. Jung 
 iii 
 
DEDICATIONS 
 
To my wife, Jadine, for her love and encouragement before and during the PhD program.  
May the rest of our lives be filled with happiness. 
 
To my children, Michael and Dana, whose daily smiles, hugs and kisses make everyday 
wonderful.  May the future bring you much joy and success. 
 
To my parents and brother, whose love and support have always been felt. 
 
To my parent-in-laws and sister-in-law, who are truly family now. 
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I greatly appreciate the advice and guidance provided by my dissertation committee: 
Brian Bushee (Chair), Catherine Schrand and Robert Holthausen.   
 
I thank Chris Armstrong, Stephanie Sikes and Holly Yang for helpful comments and 
discussions on this paper.  I am also thankful to the rest of the faculty for their advice, 
encouragement and time over the past four years, particularly Robert Verrecchia, Rick 
Lambert, Gavin Cassar, John Core, Wayne Guay and Chris Ittner. 
 
I thank Clare Wang for entering the PhD program with me, collaborating on years of 
coursework, and providing countless conversations over the course of the PhD program. 
 
I thank Ulrike Malmendier for her invaluable guidance prior to the PhD program. 
 
I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Wharton School, the Deloitte 
Foundation and the Robert R. Nathan Memorial Foundation. 
 
This paper has benefited greatly from the comments of workshop participants at the 
University of Pennsylvania, University of Michigan, Northwestern University, 
University of Chicago, New York University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, 
University of Washington and Stanford University.   
 
 v 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
INVESTOR OVERLAP AND DIFFUSION OF DISCLOSURE PRACTICES 
Michael J. Jung 
Brian J. Bushee (Supervisor of Dissertation) 
 
This paper examines how one firm’s commitment to provide more public disclosure 
affects other firms’ disclosure practices in subsequent periods. I develop an investor 
demand-driven explanation for why and when firms adopt the disclosure innovation of a 
first-mover firm.  I test the hypothesis that overlap in institutional ownership between 
two firms is a mechanism by which one firm’s greater disclosure creates demand 
pressure for the other firm to follow.  Using market risk disclosures as my empirical 
setting, I find that a firm’s decision to follow a first-mover in providing more 
quantitative information in its 10-K filing than is required by the SEC is positively 
associated with the level of, and changes in, institutional investor overlap.  I also find 
that the association is stronger for overlap among investors with greater influence over 
managers’ disclosure decisions, investors with incentives to demand public disclosure, 
and for firms whose investors are most likely to demand expanded disclosure.  Overall, 
this evidence provides new insight into patterns of intra-industry disclosure behavior and 
highlights investor overlap as a source of variation in firms’ information environments 
that can be used in future research. 
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1.0 Introduction 
This paper examines how one firm’s commitment to provide more public 
disclosure affects other firms’ disclosure practices in subsequent periods.  I develop and 
test an investor demand-driven explanation for why and when other firms follow a first-
mover’s decision to change its 10-K filing to include more quantitative information 
about market risk than is required by the SEC.  I propose that the overlapping 
institutional ownership between the first-mover and a potential follower is a mechanism 
that creates demand pressure for the follower to make a similar disclosure change.1  I test 
this hypothesis using hand-collected data about market risk disclosures from 10-K filings 
for a sample of 153 firms in five energy and financial-related industries. 
Recent studies examining “follow-the-leader” patterns of disclosure or 
accounting choice among a group of firms have hypothesized that the behavior is due to 
the effects of herding, contagion, or spillover (Brown et al. 2006; Reppenhagen 2009; 
Tse and Tucker 2010).  In general, these studies take the action of the first-mover as 
exogenous and then focus on other firms’ managers to predict how they respond based 
on their utility or cost functions (e.g., desire to deflect blame, improve decision-making).  
While this paper also takes the action of the first-mover as exogenous, it differs from the 
prior studies by considering the perspective of certain institutional investors and why 
they may demand greater disclosure from firms after observing it from a first-mover.2  
                                                 
1
 I focus on institutional investors because a large literature has shown they are sophisticated at processing 
information (Jiambalvo et al. 2002, Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007, Mikhail et al. 2010), they are the 
primary targets when CFOs set voluntary disclosure policies (Graham et al. 2005), and they affect stock 
returns more than individual investors (Gompers and Metrick 2001). 
2
 I do not focus on sell-side analysts because many small firms lack sufficient analyst coverage to compute 
overlap, analyst coverage tends to follow institutional ownership (O’Brien and Bhushan 1990, Bushee and 
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The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive, but examining the demand-driven 
explanation can provide new insight into the mechanisms by which one firm’s disclosure 
behavior alters the information sets that investors have for other firms.  For example, 
upon receiving greater disclosure from one firm they own, investors can reassess their 
beliefs about the disclosure quality of the other firms they own.  If this reassessment 
results in higher perceived information asymmetry and adverse selection, then firms with 
high investor overlap with the first-mover will experience demand pressure to also 
provide greater disclosure. 
This paper is also related to prior work examining the association between 
disclosure and total institutional ownership (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Healy et al. 
1999; Bushee and Noe 2000), but a key difference is my focus on the effect of overlap in 
institutional ownership.  I posit that overlap in ownership links two firms’ information 
environments because an institutional investor who holds a stake in both the first-mover 
and a second firm continually processes financial reports and disclosures from both 
firms and meets with managers from each firm at various venues throughout the year.3  
Thus, if the first-mover’s decision to provide greater disclosure prompts certain 
investors to reassess their beliefs about the second firm’s disclosure quality, then I 
expect overlapping investors to be the ones who do so.  In contrast, an investor who 
holds a stake in only the second firm (i.e., a non-overlapping investor) may not fully 
                                                                                                                                                
Miller 2009), and sell-side analysts do not hold the threat of possibly selling large holdings in a firm.  
Nonetheless, in empirical tests, I control for overlap in analyst coverage but I do not anticipate any 
incremental association. 
3
 Buy-side analysts repeatedly meet with managers in private meetings (Brennan and Tamarowski 2000, 
Hong and Huang 2005), over phone calls (Carleton et al. 1998), at investor conferences (Bushee, Jung and 
Miller 2009), and at the headquarters of either the firm or the buy-side analyst (Abramowitz 2006, Jackson 
2009). 
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internalize the first-mover’s change in disclosure behavior and not reassess his beliefs 
about the second firm, especially if the first-mover’s disclosure pertains to firm-specific 
information.  Such a scenario is likely in my empirical setting of market risk disclosures 
because they tend to be idiosyncratic in nature and do not help an investor assess the 
market risk exposure of other firms in the industry.4   
I draw on theories on investors’ costly information acquisition (Merton 1987), 
limited information processing capacity (Sims 2003; Peng 2005), and learning 
specialization (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2010) to provide economic rationales 
for why an investor does not perform a detailed analysis or read every disclosure 
contained in the 10-K filing of a firm in which he or she has no investment.  There has 
also been empirical evidence of similar inattention, namely, that information on 
customer-supplier relationships disclosed in 10-K filings tend to be overlooked by 
investors who do not own both the customer and supplier firms (Cohen and Frazzini 
2008). 
My main hypothesis is that a firm’s decision to follow an industry first-mover’s 
commitment to provide more public disclosure is positively associated with the overlap 
in institutional ownership between the two firms.  In my setting, committing to more 
public disclosure means making a sticky change to a 10-K filing to include more 
quantitative formats in the market risk disclosure than is required by the SEC.5  I 
                                                 
4
 The idiosyncrasy of a firm’s market risk disclosures arises because each firm can manage its exposure to 
market risk in unique ways using many types of derivatives, natural hedges, pricing contracts and risk 
management policies. 
5
 See Linsmeier and Pearson 1997 for a full discussion of these formats and the Appendix for examples. 
These disclosures are “sticky” because once added, firms tend not to remove them in future filings due to 
concerns that such an action will be view negatively by investors (discussed further in Sections 2 and 7). 
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measure the potential follower’s disclosure decision using two dichotomous variables to 
indicate whether the firm discloses multiple formats (tabular, sensitivity analysis, or 
value-at-risk) or a single format (as required by the SEC) and whether the firm changed 
its disclosure from the prior year to include multiple formats.  In a levels analysis, I find 
that a firm is more likely to disclose multiple formats if there is higher investor overlap 
with the industry first-mover, controlling for other determinants of a firm’s market risk 
disclosure.  In a changes analysis using lead-lag regressions, I find that an increase in 
investor overlap leads to an increase in the number of disclosed formats for the follower 
firm, but not vice versa.  This evidence on the relative timing of the disclosure change is 
consistent with the explanation that, conditional on a first-mover’s decision to provide 
more market risk information, overlapping investors come to demand a similar change in 
disclosure from the other firms they own in subsequent periods. 
To further distinguish my demand-driven explanation from other “supply-side” 
explanations (e.g., herding), I test cross-sectional predictions based on expected 
variation in the level of influence that institutional investors have over managers’ 
disclosure decisions and the incentives that investors have to demand public disclosure.  
I find that overlap among large institutional investors drives the positive association 
more than overlap in small institutional investors, consistent with large institutions 
having more influence over managers’ disclosure decisions.  Using the classifications of 
institutional investors from Bushee (1998, 2001), I find in the changes analysis that the 
association holds for overlap among “quasi-indexer” and “transient” investors but not 
“dedicated” investors.  This evidence provides support for the hypothesis that quasi-
 5 
 
indexers and transients prefer more public disclosure while dedicated investors have 
better access to private information (consistent with findings from Bushee and Noe 
2000).  Lastly, I find evidence consistent with overlapping investors having more 
incentive to demand expanded disclosure from firms in which they have greater 
uncertainty, conditional on observing greater disclosure from a first-mover. 
I then conduct a series of additional analyses to test certain assumptions 
underlying my hypotheses, examine possible alternative explanations, and investigate 
the robustness of the results under different research designs.  First, I test whether firms 
that follow the first-mover gain more institutional investment than firms that do not, as 
one assumption underlying my main hypothesis is that institutional investors pressure 
firms through implicit or explicit threats to sell or not buy additional shares in the firm.  I 
compute each institutional investor’s percentage ownership in the sample firms during 
the quarters immediately before and after the 10-K filing and find that the change in 
ownership is greater (more positive) for firms that follow the first-mover.  Second, I test 
for a herding effect by including a variable similar to those used in prior herding studies 
to help distinguish the effect of overlapping institutional investors.  Results suggest there 
is a positive herding effect in my disclosure setting, and that the effect of overlapping 
ownership is distinct from the herding effect.  Third, I test whether overlap in ownership 
with the industry second-mover has any incremental association with a potential follower 
firm’s disclosure decision.  I do not find evidence of such an association, suggesting that 
measuring overlap in ownership with the industry first-mover is the appropriate 
specification.  Fourth, I probe deeper into the previously-mentioned cross-sectional 
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results by partitioning overlapping ownership into six mutually-exclusive groups based 
on size (large and small) and type (dedicate, quasi-indexers and transients).  Consistent 
with the main results, I find that the positive association between investor overlap and a 
firm’s decision to follow a first-mover is driven by large institutions and institutions 
classified as quasi-indexer and transient investors.  Fifth, I test whether a firm’s change 
in market risk disclosure may be associated with a change in derivatives use, rather than 
a change in overlapping ownership.  However, using a market-based test of a firm’s 
stock return sensitivity to changes in oil prices (for energy firms) or interest rates (for 
financial firms), I do not find evidence that a firm’s derivative use changed between 
years in which it disclosed single and multiple quantitative formats.  Sixth, I use an 
instrumental variables approach to address potential endogeneity arising from 
unobservable confounding factors that could affect investor overlap and firms’ 
disclosure decisions.  I run two-stage regressions to repeat the levels and changes 
analyses and find results consistent with the main results.  Finally, as an alternative 
framework to test the effect of investor overlap on a firm’s decision to follow a first-
mover, I conduct a duration analysis to model the number of years that it takes before a 
firm follows (if ever).  The results are consistent with the main findings and indicate that 
an increase in investor overlap increases the probability that a firm will follow the first-
mover given that it has not done so already. 
This study contributes to the disclosure and institutional investor literatures in 
several ways.  First, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to hypothesize 
and empirically show that overlap in institutional ownership between two firms is 
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associated with one firm’s decision to follow the other’s disclosure behavior.  This 
evidence provides new insight into patterns of intra-industry disclosure behavior (i.e., 
how one firm’s disclosure innovation diffuses to other firms) and a better understanding 
of how one firm’s commitment to greater disclosure can affect investors’ perceptions of 
the other firms they own.  Second, by examining one specific type of disclosure over 
time and associating changes in that disclosure to changes in (overlapping) institutional 
ownership, I conduct a more direct test of how investors can exert pressure on firms to 
disclose information.  This evidence adds to prior research that documents an association 
between institutional ownership and firm disclosure using third-party ratings of 
disclosure quality (e.g., Healy et al. 1999).  Third, my focus on investor overlap 
highlights a new way to partition firms’ institutional investor bases, and importantly, a 
new source of variation in firms’ information environments that can be used in future 
research to examine variation in information transfers (e.g. Foster 1981; Thomas and 
Zhang 2008), return co-movements, and other capital market effects between pairs of 
firms.6 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, I develop my 
hypotheses and provide background on market risk disclosures.  I then describe my data 
in Section 3 and analyses in Section 4.  I present my results in Section 5 and additional 
analyses in Section 6.  I provide additional discussions and reviews of the extant 
literature on market risk disclosures and institutional investors in Sections 7 and 8, 
respectively.  Finally, I conclude in Section 9. 
                                                 
6
 For example, the synchronicity literature examines the association between firms’ stock returns and 
industry returns and how market participants affect the association (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone 2004). 
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2.0 Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Overlap in Ownership as a Mechanism for Intra-Industry Disclosure Demand 
Conditional on one firm’s new commitment to provide more public disclosure, I 
conjecture that institutional investors of that firm will eventually demand a similar 
commitment from the other firms they own and those firms will experience demand 
pressure to follow the first-mover.  The effect is likely to be strongest for firms in the 
same industry as the first-mover because the buy-side analysts employed by institutional 
investors typically follow firms along industry lines.  While some institutional investors 
may have better access to private information and actually prefer less public disclosure, 
most investors view greater disclosure positively in reducing information asymmetry, 
adverse selection, and uncertainty about a firm.  Thus, I expect that conditional on a first 
mover’s commitment to greater disclosure, the other firms in the industry that are most 
(least) likely to feel pressure to follow in subsequent periods are those that have a large 
(small) overlap in institutional ownership with the industry first-mover. 
An important assumption in my hypothesis is that a first-mover’s enhanced 
disclosure is internalized more by current shareholders than by investors without an 
ownership stake.  Accordingly, investors in a given firm that do not also own the first-
mover (i.e., non-overlapping investors) are less likely to exert pressure on the firm to 
follow the first-mover.  While this assumption is inconsistent with complete and 
frictionless markets where all investors fully incorporate all disclosures from all firms, I 
draw on theories of costly information acquisition, limited information processing 
capacity, and learning specialization to provide economic rationales for why an investor 
 9 
 
overlooks some of a firm’s disclosures if he or she has no investment in the firm (I also 
review empirical evidence of such investor inattention in Section 8). 
Since information about firms is costly to acquire and process (Merton 1987), 
even institutional investors with dedicated research analysts, large travel budgets, and 
advanced information technology, do not closely monitor all firms in the market.7  
Investors likely track earnings reports and important news events for a wide set of firms, 
but I do not expect an investor to have a deep understanding of a firm’s 10-K filing and 
be able to recognize year-to-year changes in the filings unless the investor has a stake in 
the firm.  Furthermore, because investors’ learning and processing capacities are finite, 
there are cognitive limits to: i) the number of firms investors can monitor (even if they 
are aware of more); ii) the depth of knowledge that investors can acquire for each firm; 
and iii) the speed at which investors process new information about some firms (Sims 
2003; Peng 2005).  For these reasons, an investor without an ownership stake in the first-
mover may not fully internalize or even notice the first-mover’s expanded 10-K market 
risk disclosures, especially since such information tends to be idiosyncratic (i.e., the 
market risk information disclosed by the first-mover does not help the investor value or 
assess the market risk of the firms that he or she does own). 
Costly information acquisition and limited capacity also provide an explanation 
for why investors focus on learning about firms they already own or intend to own.  This 
effect has been highlighted in recent analytical work by Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp (2010), who present a model of an investor’s joint decisions of information 
                                                 
7
 Legal considerations also restrict the number of firms that certain institutional investors may consider for 
investment.  For example, prudent person laws cause banking institutions to tilt the composition of their 
portfolios toward stocks that are viewed by courts as prudent (Del Guercio 1996). 
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learning and portfolio investment when learning capacity is limited.  A key feature of 
their model is that the interplay between learning and investing creates a feedback effect 
where an investor who chooses to learn about a firm expects to own more of it, which 
makes learning about that firm more valuable.  The result is that learning specialization 
arises because there are decreasing costs (i.e., less capacity used) and increasing benefits 
to learning about firms that the investor already owns or intends to own. 
A second important assumption of the conjecture that overlapping institutional 
investors will demand a similar commitment from the other firms they own is that most 
institutional investors prefer more public disclosure.  Institutional investors who have 
less access to private information about the firms they own should prefer more public 
disclosure, as that will reduce the amount of information asymmetry between those 
investors and firm managers and between those investors and investors with better 
access to private information (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985).  For instance, a first-
mover’s decision to change its 10-K to include more quantitative formats about market 
risk than is required by the SEC reduces investor uncertainty about the sensitivity of the 
first-mover’s cash flows to market risk.  I refer to such a decision as a commitment to 
greater disclosure because rarely did firms in my sample reverse their decision by 
reducing the number of formats in future filings.  Therefore, I expect overlapping 
investors will seek to reduce that same type of uncertainty (every year going forward) 
for the other firms they own by demanding a similar disclosure commitment. 
A third assumption is that firms face a cost-benefit tradeoff to follow a first-
mover and that the trade-off is affected by demand pressure from overlapping investors.  
 11 
 
For firms that feel demand pressure to follow the first-mover, prior work has shown that 
a commitment to greater disclosure can lead to a lower cost of capital (Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000) and increased stock liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991).  In 
contrast, a lack of commitment to provide more detailed quantitative information about 
market risk leaves investors with greater uncertainty about how shocks to interest rates 
or energy prices will affect the cash flows of the sample firms. 
However, what prevents a corner solution in which all firms follow the first-
mover are the costs of including more information than necessary in a 10-K filing.  
There may be direct costs to including multiple quantitative formats if, for instance, the 
services of an outside consulting firm are required to produce multiple sophisticated risk 
analyses.  Firms may not be willing to bear these costs if they have already met the SEC 
requirements using a single format.  Besides the direct costs, firms may not want to 
commit to disclosing multiple formats in future 10-K filings.  New disclosures added to 
10-K filings are often sticky because it is difficult to omit them in future filings, as 
investors may perceive the omission as a negative signal.  This situation is modeled 
analytically in Einhorn and Ziv (2008), who use a multi-period disclosure setting to 
show that voluntary disclosure in one period implicitly commits firms to repeat the 
disclosure in the future, which makes firms less willing to voluntarily disclose in the first 
place.  Survey evidence is consistent with this belief, as CFOs state they do not want to 
set disclosure precedents they cannot maintain (Graham et al. 2005).  Also, managers 
who already disclose a table may be wary of disclosing estimated losses in a sensitivity 
or value-at-risk analysis based on hypothetical market movements because of the 
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possibility that actual losses could be worse.  Finally, managers may simply want to 
limit the number of formats to the required minimum because additional formats may 
suggest the firm is more exposed to market risk than was previously anticipated by the 
market.  Based on these potential costs, I do not expect all firms to follow an industry 
first-mover’s decision to disclose multiple formats unless there is significant demand, 
which I have argued will most likely come from overlapping investors. 
Based on the theories and institutional details discussed above, my first 
hypothesis is that, conditional on an industry first-mover’s new commitment to provide 
more public disclosure, the decision by other firms to make a similar commitment is 
positively associated with the overlap in institutional ownership with the first-mover. 
H1: A firm’s decision to follow an industry first-mover’s commitment to greater 
disclosure is positively associated with the overlap in institutional ownership with the 
first-mover. 
 
I next examine whether the association (if it exists) is stronger for overlap among 
certain types of institutional investors.  Because institutions vary in their level of 
influence over managers, one should expect the association to be stronger for overlap in 
investors that have the most influence over corporate decisions.  Evidence from the 
shareholder activism literature suggests that large institutions such as pension funds have 
the most influence over corporate decisions through direct negotiations or the threat of 
proxy fights (Smith 1996; Carleton et al. 1998).  However, I expect other institutions 
with large total assets under management (e.g., Fidelity Investments) can also apply 
great pressure if they have a sizable position in the firm or have the potential to take a 
sizeable position.  Thus, if large institutional investors have greater influence over 
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managers than small institutional investors, then the positive association hypothesized in 
H1 will be stronger for overlap in large institutional investors. 
H2: Overlap in large institutional investors, relative to overlap in small institutional 
investors, has a stronger association with a firm’s decision to follow an industry first-
mover’s commitment to greater disclosure. 
 
Institutional investors can also vary in their preferences for public disclosure vs. 
their ability to obtain private information.  I use the Bushee (1998, 2001) classifications 
for institutional investors to partition institutions as either “dedicated,” “quasi-indexer,” 
or “transient.”  Dedicated institutional investors are characterized as long-term holders 
who have large, concentrated investments in a firm, and thus, are most likely to have 
access to private information about a firm’s exposure to market risk.  Quasi-indexers 
also have low portfolio turnover but highly diversified holdings, while transients have 
high turnover and diversified holdings.  Bushee and Noe (2000) argue and find results 
consistent with quasi-indexers relying on corporate disclosures as a low-cost mechanism 
for monitoring firms and transients favoring firms with more forthcoming disclosures 
because it lessens the price impact of trades.  Therefore, I expect the positive association 
hypothesized in H1 to be stronger for overlap in quasi-indexers and transients than 
dedicated investors. 
H3: Overlap in quasi-indexer and transient investors, relative to overlap in dedicated 
investors, has a stronger association with a firm’s decision to follow an industry first-
mover’s commitment to greater disclosure. 
 
Finally, I examine variation in the types of firms that overlapping institutional 
investors will most likely demand a commitment to greater disclosure, conditional on an 
industry first-mover’s earlier commitment.  While overlapping investors may eventually 
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demand greater disclosure from all firms they own, I expect the greatest pressure to be 
felt by firms in which investors have the greatest uncertainty.  I use a firm’s 
idiosyncratic stock return and volatility to proxy for investor uncertainty.  Therefore, my 
last hypothesis is as follows: 
H4: The association between overlap in institutional ownership and a firm’s decision to 
follow an industry first-mover’s commitment to greater disclosure is stronger for firms 
in which investors have greater uncertainty. 
 
Test results that support the last three cross-sectional predictions (H2-H4) would 
be consistent with my investor demand-driven explanation and help distinguish it from 
supply-side explanations such as herding and changes in firms’ hedging behavior. 
2.2 Market Risk Disclosures 
The empirical setting that I use to test my hypotheses is quantitative disclosures 
about market risk, as required by Financial Reporting Release (FRR) No. 48 (issued 
January 1997 by the SEC) and now contained in all firms’ 10-K filings (discussed 
further in Section 7).8  The rule requires firms to disclose their exposure to market risks 
related to changes in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates, commodity prices, 
and equity prices, but firms are given discretion over which of three possible formats to 
use: tabular presentation, sensitivity analysis, or value-at-risk.9  The institutional details 
surrounding FRR No. 48 make it an interesting economic setting because, for the first 
time, firms had to quantify and disclose an inherently complex and unpredictable 
                                                 
8
 The full title of the rule is “Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments and 
Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of Quantitative and Qualitative Information about 
Market Risk Inherent in Derivative Financial Instruments, Other Financial Instruments, and Derivative 
Commodity Instruments.” 
9
 See Linsmeier and Pearson 1997 and Ryan 2007, Chapter 12, for a full discussion of these formats. 
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subject.  Ryan (1997) described the new requirements as “revolutionary,” while 
Linsmeier and Pearson (1997) commented that “never before had the SEC required 
disclosure of forward-looking quantitative risk measures” and they “represent a material 
change in the nature and type of information provided to investors.”  The newness of this 
disclosure setting allows me to observe firms’ initial disclosure decisions, presumably 
based on their initial cost-benefit analyses of disclosing additional formats, and the 
subsequent changes from their original decision.  Further, by examining how one firm’s 
decision to include more information than required affected other firms’ subsequent 
decisions, I can provide insight into how firms and investors approach a new and 
important disclosure environment and how intra-industry patterns of disclosure behavior 
within such an environment evolve. 
This setting also addresses several research design issues.  First, while the 
disclosures are mandatory, there is a significant discretionary component because 
managers have flexibility in how to quantify the information and even how much 
quantitative information to disclose.  This flexibility resulted in significant time-series 
and cross-sectional variation in formats and clarity of the disclosures (Roulstone 1999), 
which provides statistical power to my tests.  Importantly, the variation allows me to 
objectively identify industry first-movers as those firms that were the first to disclose 
additional formats beyond the minimum requirement of the SEC and more than any 
other firm in their respective industries.  Second, the quantitative formats disclosed in 
any given firm’s 10-K filings are idiosyncratic and difficult for investors to estimate on 
their own because there are many management assumptions underlying the calculations.  
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Prior papers examining these types of disclosures have shown that the three formats are 
not perfect substitutes for each other (Rajgopol 1999) and that investors (without private 
information) cannot always estimate precisely one format based on the information 
provided in a different format (Hodder and McAnally 2001; Linsmeier et al. 2002).  As a 
result, if investors seek additional information about a firm’s market risk, they are more 
likely to demand additional formats be included in the 10-K rather than try to estimate 
the information on their own or glean common information from other firms’ market risk 
disclosures.  Third, the very nature of market risk disclosures makes them highly 
relevant to investors in industries where market risk is inherent to a firm’s core business 
operations (e.g., energy and financial industries).  Accordingly, focusing on a sample of 
firms in such industries (discussed further in the next section) maximizes the relevance 
and demand for market risk disclosures relative to other information contained in a 10-K 
and, from a practical research design perspective, facilitates the hand-collection of 
disclosure data. 
3.0 Data Description 
3.1 Sample Selection 
I focus on a sample of firms in the energy and financial industries.10  I collect 
data from 1997 to 2007 on disclosures about commodity price risk for firms in the Crude 
Petroleum & Natural Gas (SIC 1311) and Petroleum Refining (SIC 2911) industries, as 
well as interest rate risk for firms in the National Commercial Banking (SIC 6020), 
                                                 
10
 Prior studies examining the usefulness of SEC FRR No. 48 market risk disclosures use a similar, but 
much smaller sample of firms (e.g. Rajgopal 1999, Ahmed, Beatty, and Bettinghaus 2004, Liu, Ryan and 
Tan 2004). 
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Security Brokers & Dealers (SIC 6211), and Real Estate Investment Trusts (SIC 6798) 
industries.11,12   Specifically, for each year’s 10-K filing, I code whether a firm discloses 
its market risk using: i) a single format consisting of either a tabular presentation, 
sensitivity analysis or value-at-risk; ii) two formats; iii) three formats; or iv) no formats.  
To ensure a sufficient time-series of disclosures for each firm from the inception of the 
SEC rule, I require a firm to have a fiscal 1997 10-K filing and one every year for at 
least the next six years (at least through fiscal 2003).  This procedure results in a full 
sample of 153 firms and 1,619 firm-years. 
3.2 Variable Measurement 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
I exploit the fact that in each of the five industries mentioned, there was one firm 
that was clearly the first to disclose more quantitative formats in its 10-K filing than any 
other firm (and more than was required by the SEC) and continued to do so throughout 
the sample period.  I identify these five firms as the industry first-movers in terms of 
                                                 
11
 Although market risk includes foreign currency exchange risk and equity price risk, such risks are less 
relevant to the sample firms and such disclosures are not used in the empirical tests of this paper. 
12
 Using 4-digit SIC codes to define industries assumes that a buy-side analyst who follows the industry 
first-mover also follows other firms that are primarily within the same 4-digit SIC code.  This is the 
underlying assumption that motivates the conjecture that overlap in institutional ownership is a mechanism 
that facilitates intra-industry disclosure demand.  I assess the reasonableness of this assumption in the 
following manner.  While data about the span of coverage for buy-side analysts is not publicly available, I 
use IBES data on the span of coverage for sell-side analysts to proxy for buy-side coverage.  I find that for 
the 40 sell-side analysts who covered Apache Corp. in 1999, the first-mover in the Crude Oil & Natural 
Gas industry (SIC 1311), roughly 90% of the other firms that those analysts covered were also in SIC code 
1311.  The percentage is over 80% for analysts covering petroleum refining firms (SIC 2911), 60% for 
national banks (the other firms were primarily state banks under SIC 6022), and 55% for brokerages.  A 
lack of sufficient sell-side analysts covering real estate firms (SIC 6798) prevents a similar analysis.  
Therefore, to the extent that the span of coverage for sell-side analysts proxies for the span of coverage for 
buy-side analysts, basing industries on 4-digit SIC codes sufficiently captures the hypothesized overlap 
mechanism. 
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committing to greater disclosure about market risk.  These firms were not necessarily the 
largest or most profitable firms in their industries.  Subsequent to the first-mover’s 
decision, other firms in the same industry increased their number of disclosed formats 
either within a few years, more than several years later, or never.  I examine these 
leader-follower patterns and test whether their likelihood and timeliness of occurrence 
are associated with overlap (and changes in overlap) in institutional ownership. 
I define two dependent variables to capture the disclosure decisions of the 
potential followers each year.  For a levels analysis, I define MULTIPLEi,t as an 
indicator variable set to 1 (0 otherwise) if firm i in year t discloses its exposure to market 
risk using multiple (two or three) formats.  For a changes analysis, I define INCREASEi,t 
as an indicator set to 1 (0 otherwise) if firm i in year t increases its market risk disclosure 
from one format in the prior year to multiple formats in the current year.  For some firms 
in the banking industry (SIC 6020), the indicator is also set to 1 if the number of formats 
increases from two to three.13  While the drawback of these variables is that they are 
somewhat crude, they sufficiently capture a firm’s decision to disclose more quantitative 
information than was required by the SEC and they allow me to avoid making subjective 
judgments about which formats are more informative for certain firms or investors. 
3.2.2 Investor Overlap Variables 
As discussed in prior sections, I posit that overlap in institutional ownership is a 
mechanism by which one firm’s new commitment to provide more public disclosure 
prompts overlapping investors to demand a similar commitment from the other firms 
                                                 
13
 The first-mover in the banking industry, Bank of America, was the first to disclose three formats. 
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they own.  Institutionally, the demands are communicated by buy-side analysts, the 
individuals employed by institutional investors to research firms and industries.  
Therefore, ideally, I would proxy for overlap in institutional ownership at the level of the 
individual buy-side analysts.  However, the nature of the Thomson-Reuters Institutional 
Holdings (13F) Database limits measurement to the institution level.14  As a result, I 
define OVLPIIi,t as the number of overlapping institutional investors in December of 
year t between firm i in industry k and the first-mover in industry k, scaled by the total 
number of institutional investors in firm i in year t.  Thus, the variable of interest 
OVLPII takes on a value between 0 and 1 and measures the fraction of a firm’s 
institutional investor base that overlaps with an industry first-mover. 
To test H2, I partition the investor overlap variable by large and small 
institutions, as determined by an institution’s total value of assets under management.  
An institution is classified as large if it is in the top quintile of institutional investors 
ranked by total value of assets under management in year t (OVLPII_LARGEi,t).15  I 
classify the remaining overlapping institutional investors (i.e., not in the top quintile) as 
small (OVLPII_SMALLi,t).   
To test H3, I use the Bushee (1998, 2001) classifications for institutional 
investors.  I define OVLPII_DEDi,t as the number of overlapping “dedicated” 
                                                 
14
 Thomson-Reuters also provides data at the mutual level.  However, proxying for overlap in information 
demand with overlap in mutual fund ownership creates a noisier measure because each institution can 
manage multiple mutual funds yet rely on the same buy-side analyst.  For example, if Firms A and B are 
owned by the same institution but within different mutual funds, then a measure of overlap in mutual fund 
ownership would not capture the common ownership and demand for information.  Nonetheless, I test 
whether overlap in mutual fund ownership (U.S. equity growth funds) is associated with overlap in firms’ 
disclosure decisions and find weaker, but still significantly positive results (not tabulated). 
15
 Partitioning institutions by the top and bottom four quintiles allows for sufficient variation in both the 
variables for overlap in large and small institutional investors, which increases the statistical power of the 
test for H2.  However, similar results are found when partitioning institutions by the top decile and tercile. 
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institutional investors in December of year t between firm i in industry k and the first-
mover in industry k, scaled by the total number of institutional investors in firm i in year 
t.  I define OVLPII_QIXi,t and OVLPII_TRAi,t similarly for overlap in “quasi-indexer” 
and “transient” institutions, respectively. 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
While I predict that overlap in institutional ownership is associated with a firm’s 
decision to follow an industry first-mover’s commitment to greater disclosure, it may be 
the case that total institutional ownership drives a firm’s disclosure decision.  To control 
for total institutional ownership, I define PIHi,t as the percentage of firm i’s total shares 
outstanding owned by institutional holders in December of year t.  Moreover, 
information intermediaries such as sell-side equity analysts can influence firms’ 
disclosure behaviors (Lang and Lundholm 1996).  Given my focus on overlap in 
institutional ownership, I control for overlap in sell-side analyst coverage by including 
OVLPANi,t as the number of unique sell-side analysts who issued a one-year sales or 
earnings forecast (from IBES) during year t for both firm i in industry k and the first-
mover in industry k, scaled by the total number of sell-side analysts for firm i in year t.16  
To control for the fact that some firms use the same auditors as the industry first-mover 
and that may affect what a firm includes in its 10-K, I include an indicator variable 
                                                 
16
 I do not include total analysts as a control variable because in preliminary tests, that variable had over a 
70% correlation with firm size and its inclusion did not change the results for the variables of interest. 
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OVLPAUDi,t set to 1 (0 otherwise) if the two firms use the same audit firm from the 
same office location in year t.17 
The vast majority of sample firms in the five industries use derivatives, so there 
is less need to control for differences in firms’ use of derivatives.  Nonetheless, I include 
two indicator variables to capture if a firm uses derivatives for hedging (HEDGINGi,t=1, 
0 otherwise) and/or trading purposes (TRADINGi,t=1, 0 otherwise), based on 
information contained in the 10-K.  I also control for a number of firm, stock, and 
industry characteristics that may affect a firm’s decision to provide more disclosure 
about market risk.  Several studies have shown that firm size, profitability, leverage and 
growth are associated with increased voluntary disclosure (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 
1993; Frankel et al. 1999).  I control for these characteristics using the log of the market 
value of equity (LMV), return-on-assets (ROA), debt-to-equity (DTE) and book-to-
market (BTM).  All financial data required to compute these variables come from 
Compustat and are measured at the end of a firm’s fiscal year.18   
Several stock characteristics may be associated with a firm’s disclosure policy.  
To capture idiosyncratic performance, I define SAR as the stock’s annual size-adjusted 
return.  To capture liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility, I define STOCKLIQ as the 
average monthly share turnover and STOCKVOL as the standard deviation of monthly 
SARs.  Each variable is computed using CRSP data measured over a calendar year. 
Finally, I control for industry factors that may affect firms’ market risk 
disclosures, specifically the level and volatility of oil prices and interest rates.  I define 
                                                 
17
 Omitting the requirement that the auditors must be from the same office location does not change the 
main results. 
18
 For 145 of the 153 sample firms (95%), the fiscal year ends in December. 
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LNOILPRC as the log of the year-end spot price for a barrel of crude oil and OILVOL 
as the standard deviation of monthly returns on oil prices for the year, based on data 
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.  I define PRIMERATE as the year-
end prime rate and PRIMERATEVOL as the standard deviation of monthly prime rate 
changes for the year, based on data from the U.S. Federal Reserve.  Table 1 summarizes 
all variable definitions and Figure 1 shows a timeline of how all the variables are 
measured in levels and changes, as well as contemporaneously and with a one-year lag 
from the dependent variables. 
4.0 Analyses 
4.1 Levels Analysis 
My first step in testing whether investor overlap is positively associated with a 
firm’s decision to follow a first-mover’s commitment to greater disclosure (H1), 
controlling for other determinants of disclosure, is to conduct a levels analysis.  I 
estimate a logistic regression where the dependent variable (MULTIPLEi,t) measures 
whether firm i in industry k includes multiple quantitative formats in its year t 10-K 
filing, and the independent variable of interest is the level of overlap in institutional 
investors (OVLPIIi,t) in year t between that firm and the first-mover in industry k. 
P(MULTIPLE=1)i,t = β0 + β1(OVLPIIi,t) + β2(PIHi,t) + β3(OVLPANi,t) + 
β4(OVLPAUDi,t) + β5(HEDGINGi,t) + β6(TRADINGi,t) + β7(LMVi,t) + β8(ROAi,t) + 
β9(DTEi,t) + β10(BTMi,t) + β11(SARi,t) + β12(STOCKVOLi,t) + β13(STOCKLIQi,t) + 
β14(LNOILPRCt) + β15(OILVOLt) + β16(PRIMERATEt) + β17(PRIMERATEVOLt)        (1) 
 
A positive value for β1 in equation (1) would be consistent with H1. 
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Given that my focus is on the disclosure decisions of firms in years after an 
industry first-mover increases its market risk disclosure, I include only such firm-years 
in the levels regression.  For example, Apache Corporation was the first firm in the 
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas (SIC 1311) industry to disclose multiple formats, 
having done so in its 1999 10-K filing (see Appendix).  Therefore, for this industry, the 
regression includes years 2000 and later for all other firms.  Table 2 Panel A shows the 
other four industry first-movers and the years in which they first disclosed multiple 
formats.  Following this procedure for the five industries, I obtain a sample size of 148 
firms and 1,220 firm-years for the levels regression. 
4.2 Changes Analysis 
I also test H1 using a changes analysis to provide a stronger test of an association 
(O’Brien and Bhushan 1990) and eliminate firm fixed effects.  Furthermore, it allows me 
to run lead-lag regressions to examine if changes in investor overlap lead to changes in 
disclosure or vice versa.  First, I run a logistic regression where the dependent variable, 
INCREASEi,t, is an indicator of whether firm i changed its year t 10-K filing from the 
prior year to include multiple quantitative formats and the independent variable of 
interest is the change in investor overlap from year t-2 to t-1 (∆OVLPIIi,t-1).  With this 
specification, the change in the independent variable is measured with a one-year lag 
from the dependent variable. 
P(INCREASE=1)i,t = β0 + β1(∆OVLPIIi,t-1) + β2(∆PIHi,t-1) + β3(∆OVLPANi,t-1) + 
β4(∆OVLPAUDi,t-1) + β5(∆HEDGINGi,t-1) + β6(∆TRADINGi,t-1) + β7(∆LMVi,t-1) + 
β8(∆ROAi,t-1) + β9(∆DTEi,t-1) + β10(∆BTMi,t-1) + β11(∆SARi,t-1) + β12(∆STOCKVOLi,t-1) + 
β13(∆STOCKLIQi,t-1) + β14(∆OILPRCt-1) + β15(∆OILVOLt-1) + β16(∆PRIMERATEt-1) + 
β17(∆PRIMERATEVOLt-1)              (2) 
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A positive value for β1 would suggest that an increase in investor overlap in one period 
is associated with an increase in disclosure in the next period.   
Next, I essentially reverse the dependent and independent variables and regress 
next year’s change in investor overlap (∆OVLPIIi,t+1) on the indicator variable of 
whether the firm increased its disclosure in the current year (INCREASEi,t).19 
∆OVLPIIi,t+1 = β0 + β1(INCREASEi,t) + β2(∆PIHi,t) + β3(∆OVLPANi,t) + 
β4(∆OVLPAUDi,t) + β5(∆HEDGINGi,t) + β6(∆TRADINGi,t) + β7(∆LMVi,t) + β8(∆ROAi,t) 
+ β9(∆DTEi,t) + β10(∆BTMi,t) + β11(∆SARi,t) + β12(∆STOCKVOLi,t) + β13(∆STOCKLIQi,t) 
+ β14(∆OILPRCt)+ β15(∆OILVOLt) + β16(∆PRIMERATEt) + β17(∆PRIMERATEVOLt) (3) 
 
A positive value for β1 in equation (3) would suggest that an increase in disclosure in 
one period is associated with an increase in investor overlap in the next period. 
The changes regressions use a reduced sample size compared to the levels 
regressions because of the nature of the dependent variable.  The indicator variable 
INCREASEi,t captures when a potential follower increases its disclosure to include 
multiple quantitative formats.  But once a follower firm includes multiple formats and 
maintains that level throughout the rest of the sample period, subsequent years will no 
longer exhibit an increase in formats and the value of INCREASEi,t would remain at 0.  
Therefore, for such cases, I exclude those firm-years from the regression, resulting in a 
sample size of 148 firms and 865 firm-years. 
 To test the two cross-sectional predictions based on characteristics of the 
institutions (H2-H3), I repeat the levels and changes analyses but partition the investor 
overlap variable (OVLPII) by size and type of institution.  To test H2, I partition 
                                                 
19
 I also try a specification where the dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether next year’s 
change in investor overlap is positive.  Results (not tabulated) and inferences are similar to those reported 
for equation (3). 
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investors into large and small institutions, OVLPII_LARGE and OVLPII_SMALL, 
respectively.  Similarly, to test H3, I partition overlapping investors into overlapping 
dedicated institutions (OVLPII_DED), quasi-indexers (OVLPII_QIX) and transients 
(OVLPII_TRA). 
The last hypothesis (H4) predicts that the association between investor overlap 
and follower firms’ disclosure decisions is stronger for firms in which investors have 
greater uncertainty.  Since investor uncertainty in a firm can vary over time, I test H4 
using a changes analysis and by adding an interaction term (main effect also included) to 
equation (2).  I interact a firm’s change in investor overlap (∆OVLPIIi,t-1) with the 
indicator variable UNCERTi,t, which is set to 1 (0 otherwise) when firm i's change in 
annual size-adjusted return (∆SARi,t-1) is less than the sample median and the change in 
standard deviation of monthly size-adjusted return (∆STOCKVOLi,t-1) is higher than the 
sample median.20 
P(INCREASE=1)i,t = β0 + β1(∆OVLPIIi,t-1) + β2(∆PIHi,t-1) + β3(∆OVLPANi,t-1) + 
β4(∆OVLPAUDi,t-1) + β5(∆HEDGINGi,t-1) + β6(∆TRADINGi,t-1) + β7(∆LMVi,t-1) + 
β8(∆ROAi,t-1) + β9(∆DTEi,t-1) + β10(∆BTMi,t-1) + β11(∆SARi,t-1) + β12(∆STOCKVOLi,t-1) + 
β13(∆STOCKLIQi,t-1) + β14(∆OILPRCt-1) + β15(∆OILVOLt-1) + β16(∆PRIMERATEt-1) + 
β17(∆PRIMERATEVOLt-1) + β18(UNCERTi,t-1) + β19(∆OVLPIIi,t1)*(UNCERTi,t-1)       (4) 
 
H4 predicts a positive value for β19. 
5.0 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Entire Sample 
Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive information about the sample firms.  Of the 
153 firms, 43 firms are from the Crude Oil and Natural Gas industry (SIC 1311), 10 
                                                 
20
 Results are quantitatively similar when interaction terms using the continuous variables are used. 
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from Petroleum Refining (SIC 2911), 30 from National Commercial Banking (SIC 
6020), 16 from Security Brokers & Dealers (SIC 6211), and 54 from Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (SIC 6798).  I identify five firms as industry first-movers for being 
first to include more quantitative formats in their 10-K market risk disclosures than any 
other firm in their respective industries—Apache Corp., Marathon Oil, Bank of America, 
Morgan Stanley, and HRPT Properties.  Of the remaining 148 firms that can be potential 
followers, 77 firms followed in subsequent years and 71 firms did not.  The fact that 
almost half (48%) of the potential followers did not follow suggests that firms were not 
all simply following an industry-wide trend to increase market risk disclosures. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Follower Firms 
 Table 2 Panel B provides further descriptive evidence of how the 77 follower 
firms tended to disclose the same combination of multiple formats as their industry first-
movers.  Three of the industry first-movers (Apache Corp., Marathon Oil, and HRPT 
Properties) disclosed both a tabular and sensitivity analysis, and 58 of the 77 followers 
(75%) also eventually disclosed the same combination of formats.  Morgan Stanley was 
the first to include both a sensitivity analysis and value-at-risk, which was followed by 6 
other firms.  Finally, Bank of America was the first to include all three formats, which 
was followed by 10 other firms. 
Panels C, D and E contain descriptive information about the two dependent 
variables used in the levels and changes analyses.  Panel C provides a breakdown by 
year for the percentage of firms where MULTIPLE=1.  With the exception of the first 
year that this variable was recorded (1998), the percentage generally increases from 
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about 27% to 50%.  For the entire sample of 1,220 firm-years used in the levels 
regressions, MULTIPLE equals 1 for 37% of the firm-years.  For the changes analysis, 
the dependent variable is INCREASE, which is set to 1 (0 otherwise) in the year that 
firm i increases its market risk disclosure to include multiple formats.  Of the 865 firm-
years used in the changes regressions, increases occurred in 77 firm-years (9% of total 
firm-years).  Panel D shows the fiscal years in which firms increased their disclosures 
were not clustered in any particular year.  The highest rate of occurrences was from 2001 
to 2003, with 38 increases, but the other 39 increases occurred outside of that window.  
Panel E shows a breakdown by industry and event year (i.e., years after the first-mover) 
in which follower firms increased their disclosures.  Of the 77 follower firms, 23 firms 
(30%) followed within the first two years and 48 firms (62%) followed within the first 
four years. 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables 
 Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the levels and 
changes regressions.  Panel A shows that the average percentage of shares outstanding 
owned by institutional holders (PIH) is 58%.  The mean (median) number of institutional 
investors (NII) for a firm is 213 (146), of which 70% overlap with the industry first-
mover (mean OVLPII=0.705).  Most of the overlap is accounted for by large 
institutional investors (mean OVLPII_LARGE=0.547).  In terms of the Bushee (1998, 
2001) institutional investor classifications, there is on average 50% overlap of quasi-
indexers, 16% overlap of transients and 2.4% overlap of dedicated investors.  The 
median firm is covered by 9 analysts (median NAN=9), of which 2 overlaps with the 
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industry first-mover (median OVLPAN=0.20).  The reason analyst overlap is so low is 
that many firms lack substantial analyst coverage (e.g., the 1st quartile value of NAN is 
4).  Among the control variables, values for ROA, DTE, BTM, SAR, STOCKLIQ and 
STOCKVOL have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Panel B shows that over the sample period, firms experienced an average 
increase in total institutional ownership (∆PIH) of 3.1% per year.  The average increase 
in overlapping ownership was 1.1% per year, of which 0.7% came from large 
institutions and 0.4% from small institutions.  The average change in overlapping 
dedicated and quasi-indexer institutions is close to zero, which is not surprising since 
such investors tend not to trade in and out of stocks.  The average change in overlapping 
transient institutional investors is about 0.7%. 
Panel C shows the correlations of the levels variables and Panel D shows the 
correlations of the change variables.21  The main variables of interest, overlap in 
institutional investors (OVLPII) and its year-to-year change (∆OVLPII), are not highly 
correlated with any other variables.22  OVLPII has a correlation (Pearson) of -0.35 with 
total institutional ownership (PIH) and 0.25 with overlap in sell-side analysts 
(OVLPAN).  ∆OVLPII has a correlation of -0.22 with the change in log of market value 
(∆LMV). 
                                                 
21
 To keep the correlation tables to a manageable size, I omit the oil price level and volatility variables 
(LNOILPRC and OILVOL) and the interest rate level and volatility variables (PRIMERATE and 
PRIMERATEVOL).  Pair-wise correlations of these variables with the variable of interest (OVLPII) do 
not exceed |0.15|. 
22
 All the correlations with OVLPII and ∆OVLPII shown in Panels C and D of Table 2 are statistically 
significant at the 10% level or lower, with the exceptions of log of market value (LMV) and the change in 
standard deviation of monthly size-adjusted returns (∆STOCKVOL). 
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5.4 Results of Testing Hypothesis 1 
The results of testing H1 using a levels analysis are presented in Table 4 Panel A.  
The first column shows the results when only the control variables are included; standard 
errors are clustered by firm (Rogers 1993).  Firms with higher return-on-assets (ROA), 
book-to-market (BTM) and size-adjusted returns (SAR) are less likely to include 
multiple quantitative formats in their market risk disclosures.  Conversely, firms with 
higher log of market values (LMV) and firms that use derivatives for trading purposes 
(TRADING=1) are more likely to include multiple formats.  Among industry factors, 
higher oil prices (LNOILPRC) and lower interest rates (PRIMERATE) are associated 
with a firm’s use of multiple formats.  The coefficients for a firm’s total institutional 
ownership (PIH) and overlap in sell-side analyst coverage (OVLPAN) are not 
significant.  Interestingly, firms that use the same auditors (OVLPAUD) as the first-
mover tend not to disclose multiple formats, perhaps due to heightened concerns about 
revealing market risk information when a competing firm is headquartered within close 
proximity.23 
The second column shows the results when a firm’s investor overlap (OVLPII) 
with the industry first-mover is included in the regression.  The coefficient on OVLPII is 
positive and significant at the 1% level (p-value=0.0001), consistent with H1.24  To 
assess the model’s goodness of fit, I compute a hit ratio of 72.5%, defined as the number 
                                                 
23
 Out of the 57 observations in which OVLPAUD=1, roughly a quarter involved Arthur Andersen (prior 
to 2002) from the Houston office.  Omitting these observations from the analysis does not change the main 
results. 
24
 To check for industry effects, I run the levels regressions on the sample of energy and financial firms 
separately.  I find that the coefficients for investor overlap (OVLPII) remain significantly positive in each 
regression, but only at the 10% level, likely due to the loss of statistical power. 
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of correctly predicted instances of MULTIPLE=0 (572) and MULTIPLE=1 (312), 
divided by total observations (1,220).25  To assess the economic significance of the 
result, the far-right column shows each variable’s mean marginal effect multiplied by its 
inter-quartile range (for the dummy variables, the value changes from 0 to 1).  A firm 
with 84% investor overlap (3rd quartile value) has a 17.8% higher probability of 
disclosing multiple formats than a firm with 58% investor overlap (1st quartile). 
The results from the changes analysis are shown in Panels B and C.  Panel B 
shows that for the first lead-lag regression (equation 2), the coefficient for lagged change 
in investor overlap (∆OVLPIIt-1) is positive and significant (p-value=0.020).  Among the 
controls, increases in firm size (∆LMVt-1), debt-to-equity (∆DTEt-1), and decreases in 
interest rates (∆PRIMERATEt-1) are also associated with a follower firm’s decision to 
change to multiple formats.  Panel C shows that for the second lead-lag regression 
(equation 3), the coefficient on INCREASEt is not significant.  This lack of significance 
is in fact consistent with my hypothesis that investor overlap is a mechanism for future 
disclosure changes but not vice versa.  Overall, the results from the levels and changes 
analyses support the first hypothesis that a firm’s decision to follow a first-mover’s 
commitment to provide greater disclosure is positively associated with investor 
overlap.26 
                                                 
25
 In computing the hit ratio, a firm-year is classified as MULTIPLEi,t =1 (0 otherwise) if the predicted 
value exceeded the cutoff of 0.369, which is the probability that MULTIPLE=1 in the sample (450/1,220).  
A benchmark hit ratio is 46.9% (572/1220). 
26
 In untabulated results, a logistic regression of INCREASEt on contemporaneous changes in investor 
overlap (∆OVLPIIt) yields a negative but insignificant coefficient (p-value=0.52). 
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5.5 Results of Cross-Sectional Tests (H2-H4) 
 Table 5 shows the results when investor overlap is partitioned by large and small 
institutions.  Panel A presents the results of the levels regression, which shows that the 
coefficient for OVLPII_LARGE is positive and significant at the 1% level (p-
value=0.0001) while the coefficient for OVLPII_SMALL is not significant (p-
value=0.173) at conventional levels.27  Panel B shows that when the regression is 
performed in changes, the coefficient for ∆OVLPII_LARGE is significantly positive (p-
value=0.027) and the coefficient for ∆OVLPII_SMALL is not significant (p-
value=0.204).  Results from both analyses support H2 in that overlap in large 
institutional investors, who have the greatest ability to influence managers, shows the 
most significant association with a firm’s decision to follow a first-mover. 
 Table 6 shows the results when investor overlap is partitioned by overlapping 
dedicated (OVLPII_DED), quasi-indexer (OVLPI_QIX) and transient (OVLPII_TRA) 
institutional investors.  The levels analysis presented in Panel A shows that overlap in 
each class of institution has a significantly positive coefficient, contrary to the prediction 
that overlap among quasi-indexers and transients have the strongest associations with a 
firm’s disclosure decision.  However, the results of the changes regression in Panel B 
show that only the coefficients for ∆OVLPII_QIX (p-value=0.039) and ∆OVLPII_TRA 
(p-value=0.073) are significantly positive, whereas the coefficient for ∆OVLPII_DED is 
not significant at conventional levels (p-value=0.229).  The latter result is consistent 
with H3 in that overlap among investors with the greatest incentives to demand 
                                                 
27
 In untabulated results, a test for differences in the coefficients yields a p-value of 0.26.  When I partition 
large institutions to only include the top decile, a test for differences in the coefficients yields a p-value of 
0.10. 
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disclosure has a stronger association with a follower’s increase in disclosure.  However, 
one caveat is that the lack of significance for changes in overlapping dedicated 
institutions could also be due to their infrequent trading, which lowers the variation in 
the ∆OVLPII_DED variable and its statistical power. 
Finally, Table 7 presents the results of estimating regression equation (4), which 
provides cross-sectional analysis based on firm-level uncertainty. As predicted, the 
coefficient for the interaction of change in investor overlap and the indicator UNCERT 
(∆OVLPIIi,t-1)*(UNCERTi,t-1) is significantly positive (p-value=0.028).  Overall, the 
results of Table 7 support the hypothesis that overlapping investors are more likely to 
pressure firms with greater uncertainty into following a first-mover’s commitment to 
greater disclosure. 
6.0 Additional Analyses 
6.1 Examining Changes in Institutional Ownership Based on Disclosure Choice 
 The development of hypothesis 1 is based on the assumption that institutional 
investors can implicitly or explicitly threaten to sell shares or not purchase additional 
shares in a firm if they are dissatisfied with its market risk disclosures (conditional on 
the industry first-mover’s increased level of disclosure).  In this section I test this 
assumption by examining institutions’ share of ownership in each potential follower firm 
before and after its 10-K filing and partitioning on whether the firm followed the first-
mover in increasing the number of quantitative formats.  If firms benefit from following 
the first-mover, then I expect the change in ownership for followers to be greater (more 
positive) than for non-followers. 
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 I define PCTOWNj,i,t-1 as the percentage of ownership (shares owned divided by 
total shares outstanding) that institutional investor j has in firm i at the end of calendar 
quarter t-1.  I then compute DPCTOWNj,i,t as the difference in percentage ownership 
from calendar quarter t-1 to t.  For example, A.G. Edwards’ 1998 10-K was filed May 
29, 1998, so I compute the change in percentage ownership from March 31, 1998 to June 
30, 1998 for all institutions invested in that firm.  I then examine if the mean 
DPCTOWNINCREASE=1 for all firm-years in which a firm increased its market risk 
disclosure is different from the mean DPCTOWNINCREASE=0 in which a firm did not 
increase its disclosure.  Similarly, I define DNINST as the difference in the number of 
institutional (NINST) owners between quarters and examine whether that difference is 
more or less for followers and non-followers. 
The results of the difference-in-difference tests are shown in Table 8.  For the 77 
firm-years in which INCREASE=1, the mean DNINST is 4.9 and the mean DPCTOWN 
is 0.021%.  For the 785 firm-years in which INCREASE=0, the mean DNINST is also 
4.9 and the mean DPCTOWN is 0.004%.  Tests for differences in means between the 
two groups shows no significant difference in mean DNINST, but there is a difference in 
the mean DPCTOWN (p-value=0.0886).  The difference-in-difference of 0.017% 
(0.021% - 0.004%) translates into roughly 26,180 more shares owned by each 
institutional investor in the quarter immediately after an increase in market risk 
disclosure, based on average shares outstanding of 154 million for the sample firms.  
Thus, while there is no evidence that firms that follow the industry first mover gain more 
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institutional investors than non-followers, there is some evidence that institutional 
investors increase their average ownership in firms that follow the first-mover. 
6.2 Distinguishing the Institutional Overlap Effect from the Herding Effect 
As mentioned in the introduction, prior papers examining “follow-the-leader” 
patterns of accounting or disclosure choice have focused on the effect of herding (Brown 
et al. 2006; Tse and Tucker 2010) among firms when making disclosure decisions.  
Their empirical tests generally focus on a variable that measures the number or 
proportion of firms in the same industry (as firm i) that have changed their disclosure 
decisions prior to period t.  Therefore, to examine if there is a herding effect within my 
disclosure setting and to help distinguish it from the effect of demand pressure from 
overlapping institutional investors, I re-run the main tests but include an additional 
variable to control for the potential effect of herding.  LPRIORi,t is measured as the log 
of the number of firms in the same industry (as firm i) that have changed to multiple 
formats in a prior year.  If a potential follower firm is more likely to increase its market 
risk disclosure when more firms in the same industry have already done so, then 
LPRIOR should have a positive coefficient in the main levels and changes regressions. 
 Table 9 Panel A shows the results when LPRIOR is included in the main levels 
regression.  The coefficient on LPRIOR is positive and significant (p-value=<.0001), 
which suggests a positive herding effect among the sample firms.  Importantly, the 
inclusion of LPRIOR in the regression does not dramatically lower the coefficient for 
OVLPII (3.113 compared with 3.894 in Table 4A), nor does it affect its significance at 
the 1% level.  Panel B shows the results when LPRIOR is included in the main changes 
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regression.  Once again, the coefficient is positive and significant (p-value=0.055), while 
the coefficient for change in overlap (∆OVLPIIt-1) remains significantly positive (and 
similar in magnitude as in Table 4B).  Overall, the results from Table 9 indicate that the 
association between overlap in institutional ownership with a firm’s decision to follow 
an industry first-mover is incremental to a herding effect among the firms. 
6.3 Examining the Potential Influence of the Second-Movers 
 The empirical tests in this paper thus far have used a measure of overlap in 
institutional ownership between a firm and the industry first-mover.  However, it may be 
the case that overlap in ownership with another firm, such as the second-mover, could 
also be associated with a firm’s decision to increase its market risk disclosure.  To 
examine this possibility, I repeat the main tests using overlap in institutional investors 
with the industry second-mover (OVLPII_SEC).  Running this test also provides an 
indication of whether the associations shown in this paper are stronger when 
conditioning on the first- or second-mover. 
However, such a test requires two notable changes to the sample.  First, there is 
not always a unique second-mover because several firms may have followed the first-
mover in the same year.  In such cases, I select the firm with the larger market 
capitalization as the second-mover based on the assumption that the actions of larger 
firms are more influential for the rest of the industry than smaller firms.  Thus, the five 
identified industry second-movers are Nexen (SIC 1311), Amerada Hess (SIC 2911), 
Citigroup (SIC 6020), E*Trade Financial (SIC 6211) and Boston Properties (SIC 6799).  
Second, conditioning on five industry second-movers reduces the number of potential 
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followers by five firms and the number of firm-years in the levels (changes) regression 
from 1,220 to 1,001 (865 to 687) because there are fewer years following a second-
mover’s actions than a first-mover’s actions in the sample period.  Therefore, there is 
less power when repeating the main tests using overlap with the industry second-movers. 
 The results of a levels regression using the alternative overlap measure are shown 
in Table 10 Panel A.  The first column shows that the coefficient on OVLPII_SECt is 
positive and significant (p-value = 0.029), however, it is much smaller in magnitude than 
the coefficient when overlap is measured relative to the first-mover (OVLPIIt in Table 4 
Panel A).  To assess whether the weaker association is due to less influence of the 
second-mover or simply lower power, I include both measures of overlap, OVLPIIt and 
OVLPII_SECt, in the same regression.  The second column shows that OVLPIIt is 
positive and significant (and similar in magnitude as in Table 4A), while OVLPII_SECt 
is no longer significant (p-value=0.195).  Similar results are found in the changes 
regression, presented in Panel B.  The first column shows that ∆OVLPII_SECt-1 is not 
significant and the second column shows that ∆OVLPIIt-1 is positive and significant, 
similar to the result in Table 4B.  Overall, the results from this section indicate that 
overlap in ownership with the industry second-mover does not provide any incremental 
association with a firm’s decision to follow the first-mover. 
6.4 Partitioning Institutions by Size and Type 
 In testing H2, I partitioned overlap in institutional investors (OVLPII) by the size 
of the institution (large or small) and found evidence that overlap in large institutions 
drives the positive association found from testing H1.  Similarly, in testing H3, I 
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partitioned overlap by the type of institution (dedicated, quasi-indexer, or transient) and 
found evidence that overlap in quasi-indexers and transients drives the positive 
association.  However, each test may not be independent because large institutional 
investors may also proxy for investors that are quasi-indexer and/or transient.  Therefore, 
in this section, I partition overlap by both size and type of institution, resulting in six 
mutually exclusive groups of overlapping institutional investors: large and dedicated 
(OVLPII_LARGE_DED), large and quasi-indexer (OVLPII_LARGE_QIX), large and 
transient (OVLPII_LARGE_TRA), small and dedicated (OVLPII_SMALL_DED), 
small and quasi-indexer (OVLPII_SMALL_QIX), and small and transient 
(OVLPII_SMALL_TRA).  I re-run the main levels and changes regressions with the 
inclusion of all six overlap variables to examine which group(s) drives the positive 
association found from testing H1. 
 The results of the levels regression with all six overlap variables are presented in 
Table 11 Panel A.  Consistent with H2, which states that overlap in large institutional 
investors, relative to overlap in small institutional investors, has a stronger association 
with a firm’s decision to follow an industry first-mover, the coefficients for 
OVLPII_LARGE_DED, OVLPII_LARGE_QIX and OVLPII_LARGE_TRA are 
positive and significant.  In contrast, the coefficients for OVLPII_SMALL_DED, 
OVLPII_SMALL_QIX and OVLPII_SMALL_TRA are not significant.  Panel B 
presents the results of the changes regression.  The coefficient with strongest statistical 
significance is ∆OVLPII_LARGE_QIXt-1 (p-value=0.015), followed by 
∆OVLPII_LARGE_TRAt-1 (p-value=0.056) and ∆OVLPII_LARGE_DEDt-1 (p-
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value=0.093).  Again, the coefficients with the small group of institutions are not 
significant.  These results are consistent with H3, which states that overlap in quasi-
indexer and transient investors, relative to overlap in dedicated investors, has a stronger 
association with a firm’s decision to follow an industry first-mover’s commitment to 
greater disclosure. 
6.5 Examining Potential Changes in Firms’ Derivatives Use 
An alternative explanation for a firm’s decision to include multiple quantitative 
formats in its 10-K market risk disclosure is that it has increased its use of derivatives 
during the year, which calls for greater disclosure about them.  While the main tests 
include two indicator variables for whether a firm uses derivatives for hedging and/or 
trading purposes during a year, these variables do not capture a firm’s increase in 
derivatives use for either purpose during a year.  To examine this alternative explanation, 
I conduct a market-based test to see if firms’ stock return sensitivities to changes in 
either oil prices (for energy firms) or interest rates (for financial firms) are different 
depending on whether they disclose a single or multiple quantitative formats.  If firms 
increase risk hedging behavior during a year, then the firms’ stock return sensitivities to 
the industry factor should be lower in years where multiple formats are disclosed.  If 
firms increase speculative behavior, then the sensitivities to the industry factor should be 
higher.  Finally, if firms are not changing their risk behavior significantly between years 
in which a single or multiple formats are disclosed, then the sensitivities should not 
change. 
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For firms in the Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas (SIC 1311) and Petroleum 
Refining (SIC 2911) industries, I regress firms’ monthly stock returns (Ri,t) on the 
monthly returns of the CRSP equal-weighted index (Rmt), the monthly returns on oil 
prices (Rot), and the interaction of Rot with an indicator variable (MULTIPLEi,t) set to 1 
(0 otherwise) for the months within a firm’s fiscal year that includes multiple 
quantitative formats in the 10-K.  I run a pooled regression of the following equation: Ri,t 
= β0 + β1Rmt + β2Rot + β3MULTIPLEi,t*Rot.  Similarly, for firms in the Banking (SIC 
6020), Brokerage (SIC 6211) and Real Estate (SIC 6798) industries, I estimate Ri,t = γ0 + 
γ1Rmt + γ2∆Rft + γ3MULTIPLEi,t*∆Rft, where ∆Rft is the monthly percentage change in 
the 3-month Treasury Bill rate.  If the alternative explanations are true, then the 
coefficients on the interaction terms, β3 and γ3, should be significantly different from 
zero.  The results in Table 12 Panels A and B show that the coefficients are negative but 
not statistically significant (p-values above 0.40), which suggests that the risk taking 
behavior of firms are not significantly different between years in which a single or 
multiple formats are disclosed. 
6.6 Instrumental Variables Approach 
I use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to address potential endogeneity of 
overlap in institutional ownership (OVLPII) between a given firm and an industry first-
mover.  Endogeneity may arise because of unobservable confounding factors (i.e., 
correlated omitted variables) that affect the number of institutional investors who invest 
in two particular firms and also affect the market risk disclosure decisions of those two 
firms.  For example, changes in investor sentiment might cause firms within an industry 
 40 
 
to gain or lose institutional investors and also influence managers’ disclosure decisions.  
This source of endogeneity can bias the estimated coefficients in the main regressions.  
While there may be other sources of endogeneity (e.g., measurement error and 
simultaneity), the IV approach does not require that the exact source(s) be known to 
provide a general solution to the problem of an endogenous explanatory variable 
(Wooldridge 2001).  Therefore, as a robustness check, I conduct a two-stage analysis 
where I repeat the levels and changes regressions using fitted values of investor overlap. 
My instrumental variables in the first stage regression are the measured 
differences in stock return, volatility, and liquidity between a given firm and its industry 
first-mover.  For example, I measure the difference in annual size-adjusted returns as 
DSARi,t = SARi,t – SARfirst-mover,t.  Similarly, I define the differences in each firm’s 
idiosyncratic stock volatility (DSTOCKVOLi,t) and liquidity (DSTOCKLIQi,t).  I expect 
these variables to be negatively correlated with the level of investor overlap (OVLPII) 
between two firms because institutions tend to invest in stocks with similar 
characteristics (O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Gompers and Metric 2001).  At the same 
time, I do not believe these variables should be correlated with a firm’s decision to 
increase the number of quantitative formats in its 10-K market risk disclosure, other than 
through overlap in institutional ownership.  The last instrument I include is a measure of 
equity fund flows into the fund industry.  I define EQFUNDFLOWS_CHGt as the ratio 
of equity fund flows for the year divided by total equity assets at the beginning of the 
year, based on data from the National Association of U.S. Investment Companies. 
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In the first stage, I regress a firm’s investor overlap with its industry first-mover 
(OVLPIIi,t) on all the instruments and covariates from regression equation (1).  The R-
squares from the first-stage regressions for each of the five industries range from 0.33 to 
0.84.  In the second stage, I obtain the fitted values of overlap (OVLPII_HATi,t) and re-
run the levels and changes regressions of equations (1) and (2).  The results are reported 
in Table 13; standard errors have been adjusted to account for the fact that 
OVLPII_HAT has been estimated from the data.  Panel A shows that the coefficient for 
OVLPII_HATt is significantly positive and larger in magnitude than the coefficient in 
Table 4 Panel A (4.9 vs. 3.9), suggesting the latter was biased downward.28  Panel B 
shows that the coefficient for ∆OVLPII_HATt-1 is significantly positive and smaller in 
magnitude than the coefficient in Table 4 Panel B (3.2 vs. 4.4), suggesting the latter was 
biased upward.  Nonetheless, the results from the two-stage analyses are consistent with 
H1. 
6.7 Hazard Model 
As an alternative framework to test the effect of investor overlap on firms’ 
disclosure decisions, I conduct a duration analysis, or hazard model, to model the time it 
takes for a firm to follow the first-mover (if ever).  Hazard models have been used in 
prior accounting studies to model the time before a firm issues an earnings warning (Tse 
and Tucker 2010) or a capital expenditure forecast (Brown et al. 2006), and before an 
employee exercises stock options (Armstrong et al. 2007).  However, unlike the prior 
                                                 
28
 To test the endogeneity/exogeneity of the level of investor overlap (OVLPII), I take the residuals from 
the first-stage regression and include them in the original levels regression (equation 1).  The coefficient 
on the residuals is significantly negative (p-value=0.016), which suggests some endogeneity (Smith and 
Blundell 1986).. 
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papers, time in my setting is discrete in the sense that 10-K filings are issued once a year, 
which makes estimating a hazard model analogous to the logistic regressions in the main 
tests (Cox 1972).  Nonetheless, estimating a hazard model could yield additional insight 
on the effect of various covariates because, unlike the logistic regressions, the hazard 
model does not assume a specific parametric distribution for the baseline hazard function 
or the error term. 
 I estimate a semi-parametric, discrete-time Cox proportional hazard model.  The 
hazard rate is the conditional probability that a firm will increase disclosure in year t 
given that it has not done so already in prior years.  Time is measured in number of years 
(TIMEi,t) and the hazard rate function is given by: h(t;x)/(1-h(t;x)) = h0(t)/(1- 
h0(t))exp(β’x(t)), where h0(t) is an unspecified baseline hazard function, x(t) is a vector 
of time-varying observable covariates, and β is a vector of unknown regression 
parameters. The baseline hazard function is the common probability that a firm will 
increase its disclosure given that all explanatory variables are equal to zero.  If an 
increase in investor overlap has a positive effect on the hazard rate, then the parameter 
estimate for investor overlap will be positive. 
 Since I model the time to a change in disclosure, I estimate the hazard model 
using variables measured in changes, consistent with the variables used in the logistic 
regression of equation (2).  The results of the estimation are presented in Table 14; 
standard errors are based on the robust sandwich covariance matrix of Lin and Wei 
(1989) that is robust to model mis-specification.  Panel A shows descriptive statistics of 
the dependent variable TIMEt.  On average, the 77 firms that eventually followed the 
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first-mover did so 4.1 years after the industry first-mover (consistent with the descriptive 
statistics presented in Table 2E).  Panel B shows that the coefficient for investor overlap 
(∆OVLPIIt-1) is significantly positive and similar in magnitude to the coefficient in 
Table 4 Panel B, indicating an increase in investor overlap increases the conditional 
probability that a firm will follow the first-mover.  The hazard estimation results also 
show that, in addition to firm size (∆LMVt-1) and debt-to-equity (∆DTEt-1), increases in 
the volatility of oil prices (∆OILVOLt-1), interest rates (∆PRIMERATEVOLt-1), a firm’s 
stock (∆STOCKVOLt-1), and declines in interest rate levels (∆PRIMERATEt-1) increase 
the hazard rate. 
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7.0 Additional Discussion on Market Risk Disclosures 
7.1 The Evolution of Market Risk Disclosures and Extant Literature 
In the early 1990’s, a wave of companies reporting highly publicized derivative 
losses (e.g., Proctor & Gamble, Gibson Greetings, Metallgesellschaft AG), led to a call 
from investors, creditors and regulators for improvement in the financial reporting and 
disclosure of companies’ risk exposures and use of derivatives.  In October 1994, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 119 (SFAS 119), Disclosure about Derivative Financial 
Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments.  The new rule increased the general 
level of disclosure about derivatives, but researchers and regulators still felt there was 
insufficient quantitative information about market risk and how the effects of derivatives 
flowed through the financial statements (Herz et al. 1996). 
To address this problem, in January 1997 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR No. 48), which 
required companies to disclose qualitative and quantitative information about market 
risk.  Market risk is defined as risk to earnings, cash flows, or fair values arising from 
fluctuations in foreign exchange rate, interest rates, commodity prices and equity prices.  
Companies are required to use one of three quantitative formats—a tabular presentation, 
sensitivity analysis, or value-at-risk estimate—to disclose how market risk can affect 
earnings, cash flow, or fair values of financial instruments.  The flexibility was intended 
to give each company the discretion to disclose its market risk exposure in a manner 
consistent with internal reporting. 
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 Since then, a number of studies have examined the effectiveness of the market 
risk disclosures and whether or not investors find them useful.  A year after the SEC rule 
came into effect, a survey by Roulstone (1999) indicated that market risk disclosures 
improved greatly under FRR No. 48, but there was significant room for improvement as 
the disclosures varied widely in detail and clarity.  An internal staff report by the SEC 
made similar conclusions (SEC Staff Report 1998).  Even before a sufficient time-series 
of market risk disclosures was available, a number of academic studies used proxies for 
FRR No. 48 disclosures to provide early evidence that the disclosures were useful to 
investors in certain industries, such as the oil and gas industry (Rajgopal 1999) and 
commercial banking industry (Ahmed et al. 2000).  Later studies examining actual FRR 
No. 48 disclosures also concluded that they were useful to investors in reducing 
uncertainty (Linsmeier et al. 2002) and predicting future revenue (Jorion 2002; Liu et al. 
2004). 
However, market risk disclosures appear to be more important in certain 
industries, such as those in which market risk is highly correlated with operating risk.  
Accordingly, to increase statistical power, many of the above-mentioned studies (with 
the exception of Linsmeier et al. (2002)) used a sample of firms in the energy or 
financial industries, where operations are greatly affected by commodity prices and 
interest rates, respectively.  Guay and Kothari (2003) question whether the magnitude of 
derivative use is economically significant and find that derivative use is modest for a 
broad sample of large firms.  As a result, this paper uses a sample of firms in which 
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market risk is expected to be highly correlated with operating risk to ensure that the 
disclosures are important to investors and other stakeholders. 
7.2 The Use of Market Risk Disclosures by Investors 
The methods by which institutional investors use market risk disclosures to 
analyze and value firms depend upon many factors, including but not limited to: i) the 
type of firm (e.g., financial, energy and multi-national); ii) the specific operations of the 
firm (e.g., lending, trading, commodity production, etc.); iii) the type of quantitative 
information disclosed by the firm (tabular, sensitivity, value-at-risk); and iv) the amount 
of quantitative information disclosed (one format or multiple formats).  While a full 
discussion for all the possible scenarios is beyond the scope of this paper, I provide an 
overview of the methods that investors can use disclosures specifically about interest 
rate risk to help analyze financial firms and disclosures about commodity price risk to 
help analyze energy firms. 
A textbook approach to valuing a financial firm is to analyze its portfolio of 
financial instruments carried on the balance sheet at fair value, as well as to analyze its 
future stream of net interest earnings from financial operations on a discounted cash flow 
basis (Ryan 2007, 16-17).  Within this framework, information disclosed in the tabular 
format can be used to estimate the duration of the firm’s portfolio of financial 
instruments and a firm’s re-pricing gap (interest-earning assets due to be re-priced minus 
interest-paying liabilities due to be re-priced) at different time intervals.  The investor 
can then assess the expected changes in fair values of financial instruments and changes 
in net interest earnings based on possible changes in the level, slope and shape of the 
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yield curve, although the investor would need to make some simplifying assumptions 
about the timing of fixed-rate coupon payments and floating-rate re-pricing schedules 
(among other assumptions).  Information disclosed in a sensitivity analysis already 
incorporates these assumptions from management (which are usually more accurate than 
the investor’s assumptions) and often provides the assessment of value or earnings 
change in a simple and concise manner, typically for only a limited (one or two) number 
of interest rate scenarios.  Information disclosed in a value-at-risk incorporates the 
covariances of different classes of assets and liabilities and provides an estimate of one 
particular bad-case scenario over a specific time period and with a specific probability of 
occurrence.  In summary, information contained in each format is complementary and 
gives an investor a more precise assessment of the potential impact on fair values and net 
interest earnings for a financial firm from realizations of future interest rate moves. 
For energy firms, the information contained in a commodity price risk disclosure 
provides the investor an estimate of how revenues or earnings may change given a 
change in oil and gas spot prices.  For example, information about commodity 
derivatives (e.g. notional amounts, maturities and average strike prices) disclosed in the 
tabular format can be used by an investor to estimate the proportion of the firm’s 
production that is hedged at different time intervals and at different strike prices.  The 
investor can then assess potential gains and losses from derivative contracts, which often 
flow through the firm’s top or bottom line, based on hypothetical or realized changes in 
commodity prices.  Similarly, the firm may summarize such an assessment of their 
derivative positions or even production revenues in a sensitivity analysis for a limited 
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number of commodity price scenarios.  Information disclosed in a value-at-risk estimate 
incorporates the covariances of price movements for different classes of commodities for 
firms with several energy businesses and/or trading operations.  Overall, the commodity 
price risk disclosures provide an investor with a more precise assessment of how 
sensitive the firm’s revenues or earnings are to fluctuations in energy prices. 
8.0 Literature Review on Institutional Investors 
8.1 The Growth in Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors own the majority of U.S. corporate equities (compared 
with individual investors), and their percentage ownership has steadily increased over 
the past several decades.  According to the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds report, 
institutional ownership first surpassed 50% in 1996 and that percentage has increased to 
64% in 2008.  The shift appears even more dramatic when one considers that in the 
1950’s, individual households owned over 90% of U.S. stocks.  Today, the largest 
institutions include mutual funds, private pension funds, public retirement funds, and 
insurance companies.  Not surprisingly, survey evidence shows that corporate CFOs 
consider institutions as their most important investors (Graham et al. 2005). 
This changing composition of U.S. stock ownership has prompted much 
academic research on the determinants and effects of institutional ownership.  The 
common perception of institutions is that they are more sophisticated and informed than 
individual investors (O’Brien and Bhushan 1990; Walther 1997), and thus, their growing 
importance has implications for capital allocation, corporate governance, stock market 
volatility, and even information intermediaries such as sell-side analysts. 
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8.2 The Determinants of Institutional Ownership 
Early studies on the determinants of institutional ownership hypothesized that 
institutions prefer stocks with certain characteristics related to firm size, visibility, and 
trading liquidity.  O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) found that institutions tend to own stocks 
in large companies and companies with higher analyst following, and they believe that 
prudence laws help explain institutions’ preference for such firms.  Del Gercio (1996) 
also finds that fiduciary duty and legal liability influence the preference of banks to 
invest in companies that are viewed as “prudent” stocks.  Falkenstein (1996) examines 
the holdings of open-end mutual funds and finds they prefer stocks with high visibility, 
information flow, and volatility.  He posits that fund managers may be trying to invest in 
stocks with the potential for large price movements in order to outperform passive index 
funds and benchmarks.  Later studies that examine larger samples of institutions 
consistently find that ownership is positively associated with firm size, stock liquidity, 
and visibility (Gompers and Metrick 2001; Bushee 2001).  Bushee and Miller (2009) 
examine smaller firms that lack the typical characteristics preferred by institutions and 
find that such firms who increase investor relations activities can increase their visibility 
and ownership among institutional investors. 
After controlling for the above-mentioned stock characteristics, other studies 
examine how institutional ownership is associated with firms’ quality of accounting 
information and disclosures.  Firms with higher disclosure quality have greater 
institutional ownership (Healy et al. 1999; Bushee and Noe 2001) and firms that adopt 
accounting conventions that are familiar to investors and/or considered higher quality 
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(such as U.S. or International GAAP) have higher ownership among U.S. (Bradshaw et 
al. 2004) and foreign institutional investors (Covrig et al. 2007).  The findings from this 
stream of research suggest that a firm’s accounting and disclosure choices can affect its 
level of institutional ownership. 
8.3 Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 
In contrast, a large literature in corporate governance indicates that institutional 
investors can influence a firm’s accounting and disclosure choices.  Early theoretical 
work suggests that institutions with the largest stakes and longer investment horizons 
have the greatest incentive and ability to influence firm managers and directors 
(Schleifer and Vishny 1986; Kahn and Winton 1998; Bolton and Von Thadden 1998).  
Many empirical studies have found results to be consistent with this notion. 
Researchers have examined a number of mechanisms by which institutions can 
explicitly or implicitly monitor management and affect firm behavior.  The shareholder 
activism literature shows that institutions with large stakes can directly affect 
governance issues through communications with management and/or threats of proxy 
contests (Smith 1996; Carleton et al. 1998).  However, institutions can also influence 
firm behavior implicitly through their decisions to buy and sell a firm’s stock.  Prior 
studies have found that changes in institutional ownership are associated with changes in 
firm management (Parrino et al. 2003), executive compensation (Hartzell and Starks 
2003), and M&A activity (Gaspar et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2007).  Furthermore, the 
earnings guidance literature has shown that institutional ownership is associated with 
more frequent, precise and disaggregated management forecasts (Ajinkya et al. 2005; 
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Lansford et al. 2009).  These studies argue that the increased voluntary disclosures are a 
response by management to increased demand for information by institutional investors. 
8.4 The Effect of Overlap in Institutional Ownership of Firms 
While the effects of total institutional ownership have been studied, the effect of 
overlap in institutional ownership of firms, either on the behavior of firm managers or 
institutional investors, has largely been unexplored in the prior literature.  To the best of 
my knowledge, there are two published papers that empirically examine the effects of 
cross-ownership (i.e. overlap) in firms.  In the area of corporate policy, Hansen and Lott 
(1996) focus on externalities between two firms and theorize that investors who own 
shares in both firms do not want each firm to pursue individual firm maximization as its 
corporate objective, but rather, portfolio maximization.  That is, when a firm’s value 
depends upon another’s actions as well as on its own actions, investors who own both 
firms want each firm to internalize the externalities in their policy decisions.  Examples 
of inter-firm externalities include actions taken by competing firms, vertically integrated 
firms, or firms engaged in legal litigation against each other.  The authors empirically 
test an argument put forth in the legal literature (Easterbrook and Fischel 1982) that in 
corporate control transactions, investors who own shares of both the acquirer and target 
firm care about the total gain of the transaction, not how the gain is allocated.  Thus, the 
price an acquirer is willing to pay for a target should be positively associated with the 
overlap in ownership between the two firms.  They find evidence consistent with their 
prediction that acquirers, on average, pay more for public firms than private firms 
because there is greater likelihood of common ownership.  Even in their restricted 
 52 
 
sample in which both the acquirer and target are public, there is evidence that greater 
cross-ownership leads the acquirer to pay more for the target firm. 
Also in a setting with firm externalities, Cohen and Frazzini (2008) use a sample 
of customer-supplier firm pairs and examine how a news shock to a customer firm’s 
stock price eventually translates into a shock to a supplier firm’s stock price.  They test 
the hypothesis that some investors are inattentive to such links, leading to slow diffusion 
of value-relevant news and predictable returns for supplier firm stocks.  Importantly, 
they hypothesize and test that the inattention varies with the common ownership 
between the two firms.  Their results indicate that when there is greater overlap in 
ownership between customer and supplier, shocks to the customer’s stock get 
impounded into the supplier’s stock more quickly. 
Despite the lack of attention in the literature on the effects of overlap in 
ownership, the above-mentioned papers underscore two important notions related to the 
hypothesis development of this paper.  First, managerial decisions about corporate policy 
can depend on both the decisions of other firms and on the overlap in ownership with 
those other firms.  In that vein, the specific research question examined in this paper is 
whether one firm’s decision to adopt the disclosure practice of another firm is associated 
with their overlap in ownership.  Second, the assumption that an investor may overlook a 
value-relevant disclosure contained in a firm’s 10-K filing if he or she is not a current 
shareholder is not new or unlikely.  Cohen and Frazzini (2008) collect information about 
customer-supplier relationships from 10-K filings and show evidence that such 
information is more likely to be overlooked by non-overlapping investors.  Similarly, in 
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this paper, I collect information about market risk for a sample of firms whose core 
operations are subject to substantial market risk, and I argue that year-to-year changes in 
these disclosures are internalized more by current shareholders than investors without a 
stake in the firm. 
9.0 Conclusion 
This paper examines how one firm’s commitment to provide more public 
disclosure affects other firms’ disclosure practices in subsequent periods.  To the best of 
my knowledge, this paper is the first to hypothesize and empirically show that overlap in 
institutional ownership between two firms is associated with a firm’s disclosure behavior 
(i.e., in this setting, to adopt another firm’s disclosure innovation).  My test of a demand-
driven explanation for why firms change disclosures provides evidence that institutional 
investors exert pressure on firms to disclose information, which contributes to prior work 
that suggests firms provide information in anticipation of investor demand.  This 
evidence also provides new insight into patterns of intra-industry disclosure behavior 
and a better understanding of how one firm’s commitment to greater disclosure can 
affect investors’ perceptions of other firms.  My focus on overlap in institutional 
ownership highlights a new way to partition firms’ institutional investor bases, and 
importantly, a new source of variation in firms’ information environments that can be 
used in future research to examine variation in information transfers, return co-
movements, and other capital market effects between pairs of firms. 
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Appendix 
Examples of Market Risk Disclosures Using Three Possible Quantitative Formats 
Panel A: Tabular Presentation (from Apache Corp.’s 1999 10-K Filing) 
Commodity Price Hedges -- Apache periodically enters into commodity derivative contracts and fixed-price 
physical contracts to manage its exposure to oil and gas price volatility. Commodity derivatives contracts, 
which are usually placed with major financial institutions that the Company believes are minimal credit risks, 
may take the form of futures contracts, swaps or options.  The derivative contracts call for Apache to receive, 
or make, payments based upon the differential between a fixed and a variable commodity price as specified in the 
contract. As a result of these activities, Apache recognized hedging losses of $6.7 million in 1999 and hedging 
gains of $1.3 million and $14.5 million in 1998 and 1997, respectively. The hedging gains and losses are 
included in oil and gas production revenues in the statement of consolidated operations. 
     The following table and note thereto cover the Company's pricing and notional volumes on open commodity 
derivative contracts as of December 31, 1999: 
                                                           2000     2001     2002    2003    2004    THEREAFTER 
                                                          ------   ------   ------   -----   -----   ---------- 
Natural Gas Swap Positions (FERC indexes): 
  Pay fixed price -- January 2000 to July 2008 (thousand 
    MMBtu/d)(1).........................................      50       30       30      30      30        32 
  Average swap price, per MMBtu(1)......................  $ 2.27   $ 2.27   $ 2.31   $2.35   $2.39     $2.51 
Oil Swap Positions (NYMEX): 
  Receive fixed price -- January to August 2000 
    (Mbbl/d)............................................       5       --       --      --      --        -- 
  Swap price, per bbl...................................  $19.42       --       --      --      --        -- 
Oil Swap Positions (NYMEX): 
  Receive fixed price -- January 2000 to June 2002 
    (Mbbl/d)............................................      10        9        8      --      --        -- 
  Average swap price, per bbl...........................  $20.52   $18.82   $18.45      --      --        -- 
Oil Collar Positions (NYMEX): 
  Volume -- January to August 2000 (Mbbl/d).............      13       --       --      --      --        -- 
  Average ceiling price, per bbl........................  $23.00       --       --      --      --        -- 
  Average floor price, per bbl..........................  $17.73       --       --      --      --        -- 
Gas Collar Positions (NYMEX): 
  Volume -- January to August 2000 (thousand MMBtu/d)...      80       --       --      --      --        -- 
  Average ceiling price, per MMBtu......................  $ 3.31       --       --      --      --        -- 
  Average floor price, per MMBtu........................  $ 2.06       --       --      --      --        -- 
(1) The Company has various contracts to supply gas at fixed prices. In order to lock in a margin on a portion 
of the volumes, the Company is a fixed price payor on swap transactions. The average physical contract price 
ranges from $2.32 in 2000 to $2.56 in 2008. The fair value of these hedges was $11.1 million at December 31, 
1999, all of which is related to the arrangements discussed in Note 6. 
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APPENDIX (continued) 
Examples of Market Risk Disclosures Using Three Possible Quantitative Formats 
Panel B: Sensitivity Analysis (from Apache Corp.’s 1999 10-K Filing) 
MARKET RISK 
 
  Commodity Risk 
 
     The Company's major market risk exposure is in the pricing applicable to 
its oil and gas production. Realized pricing is primarily driven by the 
prevailing worldwide price for crude oil and spot prices applicable to its 
United States and Canadian natural gas production. Historically, prices 
received for oil and gas production have been volatile and unpredictable and 
price volatility is expected to continue. Monthly oil price realizations ranged 
from a low of $10.09 per barrel to a high of $24.11 per barrel during 1999. Gas 
price realizations ranged from a monthly low of $1.60 per Mcf to a monthly high 
of $2.74 per Mcf during the same period. 
 
     The Company periodically enters into hedging activities on a portion of 
its projected oil and natural gas production through a variety of financial and 
physical arrangements intended to support oil and natural gas prices at 
targeted levels and to manage its exposure to oil and gas price fluctuations. 
Apache may use futures contracts, swaps, options and fixed-price physical 
contracts to hedge its commodity prices. Realized gains or losses from the 
Company's price risk management activities are recognized in oil and gas 
production revenues when the associated production occurs. Apache does not hold 
or issue derivative instruments for trading purposes. In 1999, Apache 
recognized a net loss of $3.1 million from hedging activities that decreased 
oil and gas production revenues. The net loss in 1999 includes $6.7 million in 
derivatives losses and $3.6 million in gains from fixed-price physical gas 
contracts. Gains or losses on derivative contracts are expected to be offset by 
sales at the spot market price or to preserve the margin on existing physical 
gas contracts. 
 
     At December 31,1999, the Company had open natural gas price swap positions 
with a positive fair value of $11.1 million. A 10 percent increase in natural 
gas prices would increase the fair value by $19.7 million. A 10 percent 
decrease in prices would decrease the fair value by $19.7 million. The Company 
also had open oil price swap positions at December 31, 1999 with a negative 
fair value of $(9.4) million. A 10 percent increase in oil prices would 
decrease the fair value by $18.3 million. A 10 percent decrease in oil prices 
would increase the fair value by $18.3 million. Discount rates used in arriving 
at fair values range from 6.5 percent for 2000 to 7.3 percent for 2008. 
 
     At December 31, 1999, the Company also had natural gas commodity collars 
with a fair value of $.8 million and oil commodity collars with a fair value of 
$(4.9) million. A 10 percent increase in oil and gas prices would change the 
fair values of the gas collars and the oil collars by $(.9) million and $(5.2) 
million, respectively. A 10 percent decrease in oil and gas prices would change 
the fair values of the gas collars and the oil collars by $1.6 million and $3.9 
million, respectively. The model used to arrive at the fair values for the 
commodity collars is based on the Black commodity pricing model. Changes in 
fair value, assuming 10 percent price changes, assume non-constant volatility 
with volatility based on prevailing market parameters at December 31,1999. 
 
     Notional volumes associated with the Company's derivative contracts are 
shown in Note 9 to the Company's consolidated financial statements. 
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APPENDIX (continued) 
Examples of Market Risk Disclosures Using Three Possible Quantitative Formats 
Panel C: Value-At-Risk (from Unocal Corp.’s 2001 10-K Filing) 
Commodity Price Risk - The Company is a producer, purchaser, marketer and 
trader of certain hydrocarbon commodities such as crude oil and condensate, 
natural gas and refined products and is subject to the associated price risks. 
The Company uses hydrocarbon price-sensitive derivative instruments 
(hydrocarbon derivatives), such as futures contracts, swaps, collars and 
options to mitigate its overall exposure to fluctuations in hydrocarbon 
commodity prices. The Company may also enter into hydrocarbon derivatives to 
hedge contractual delivery commitments and future crude oil and natural gas 
production against price exposure. The Company also actively trades hydrocarbon 
derivatives, primarily exchange regulated futures and options contracts, 
subject to internal policy limitations. 
 
The Company uses a variance-covariance value at risk model to assess the market 
risk of its hydrocarbon derivatives. Value at risk represents the potential 
loss in fair value the Company would experience on its hydrocarbon derivatives, 
using calculated volatilities and correlations over a specified time period 
with a given confidence level. The Company's risk model is based upon 
historical data and uses a three-day time interval with a 97.5 percent 
confidence level. The model includes offsetting physical positions for 
hydrocarbon derivatives related to the Company's fixed price pre-paid crude oil 
and pre-paid natural gas sales. The model also includes the Company's net 
interests in its subsidiaries' crude oil and natural gas hydrocarbon 
derivatives and forward sales contracts. Based upon the Company's risk model, 
the value at risk related to hydrocarbon derivatives held for purposes other 
than hedging was approximately $11 million at December 31, 2001 and 
approximately $12 million at December 31, 2000. The value at risk related to 
hydrocarbon derivatives held for non-hedging purposes was approximately $5 
million at December 31, 2001 and approximately $13 million at December 31, 
2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Appendix provides examples of the three quantitative formats prescribed by the SEC in Financial 
Reporting Release No. 48 (1997).  Firms are required to disclose their exposures to market risk, to the 
extent that the risk is material, using one of three possible quantitative formats: tabular presentation, 
sensitivity analysis, and value-at-risk.  Market risk includes interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange 
risk, commodity price risk, and equity price risk.  Examples are from the Crude Oil & Natural Gas 
industry (SIC 1311).  Apache Corp. was the first firm in the industry to include multiple formats in its 
market risk disclosure, having done so in its 1999 10-K filing.  Panel A illustrates its tabular presentation 
and Panel B shows its sensitivity analysis.  Unocal Corporation included multiple formats beginning with 
its 2001 10-K filing; panel C illustrates its value-at-risk estimates. 
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FIGURE 1 
Timeline of Variable Measurement 
 
MULTIPLE t
INCREASE t
year t-1 year t
10-K filing date 10-K filing date
year  t-2 year  t-1 year  t
∆OVLPII t-1 OVLPII t-1 ∆OVLPII t OVLPII t
∆OVLPII_LARGE t-1 OVLPII_LARGE t-1 ∆OVLPII_LARGE t OVLPII_LARGE t
∆OVLPII_SMALL t-1 OVLPII_SMALL t-1 ∆OVLPII_SMALL t OVLPII_SMALL t
∆OVLPII_DED t-1 OVLPII_DED t-1 ∆OVLPII_DED t OVLPII_DED t
∆OVLPII_QIX t-1 OVLPII_QIX t-1 ∆OVLPII_QIX t OVLPII_QIX t
∆OVLPII_TRA t-1 OVLPII_TRA t-1 ∆OVLPII_TRA t OVLPII_TRA t
∆PIH t-1 PIH t-1 ∆PIH t PIH t
∆OVLPAN t-1 OVLPAN t-1 ∆OVLPAN t OVLPAN t
∆OVLPAUD t-1 OVLPAUD t-1 ∆OVLPAUD t OVLPAUD t
∆HEDGING t-1 HEDGING t-1 ∆HEDGING t HEDGING t
∆TRADING t-1 TRADING t-1 ∆TRADING t TRADING t
∆LMV t-1 LMV t-1 ∆LMV t LMV t
∆ROA t-1 ROA t-1 ∆ROA t ROA t
∆DTE t-1 DTE t-1 ∆DTE t DTE t
∆BTM t-1 BTM t-1 ∆BTM t BTM t
∆SAR t-1 SAR t-1 ∆SAR t SAR t
∆STOCKLIQ t-1 STOCKLIQ t-1 ∆STOCKLIQ t STOCKLIQ t
∆STOCKVOL t-1 STOCKVOL t-1 ∆STOCKVOL t STOCKVOL t
∆OILPRC t-1 LNOILPRC t-1 ∆OILPRC t LNOILPRC t
∆OILVOL t-1 OILVOL t-1 ∆OILVOL t OILVOL t
∆PRIMERATE t-1 PRIMERATE t-1 ∆PRIMERATE t PRIMERATE t
∆PRIMERATEVOL t-1 PRIMERATEVOL t-1 ∆PRIMERATEVOL t PRIMERATEVOL t
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates when each variable is measured relative to a firm’s 10-K filing for year t. For 145 of 
the 153 sample firms (95%), the fiscal year ends in December.  All variable definitions are provided in 
Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Name Definition Source of Data 
MULTIPLE 
Indicator set to 1 if firm i in year t disclosed multiple 
formats, 0 otherwise. 10-K filings 
INCREASE 
Indicator set to 1 if firm i in year t increased the number 
of formats from the prior year, 0 otherwise. 10-K filings 
NII 
Number of institutional investors for firm i in December 
of year t. 
Thomson-Reuters 
(13F) Database 
OVLPII 
Number of overlapping institutional investors in 
December of year t between firm i in industry k and the 
first-mover in industry k, scaled by NII. 
Thomson-Reuters 
(13F) Database 
OVLPII_LARGE 
Overlapping institutional investors that are in the top 
quintile ranked by total value of assets under 
management in year t. 
Thomson-Reuters 
(13F) Database 
OVLPII_SMALL 
Overlapping institutional investors that are in the bottom 
four quintiles ranked by total value of assets under 
management in year t. 
Thomson-Reuters 
(13F) Database 
OVLPII_DED 
Overlapping institutional investors that are classified as 
"dedicated" in year t. 
Thomson-Reuters 
(13F) Database 
OVLPII_QIX 
Overlapping institutional investors that are classified as 
"quasi-indexer" in year t. 
Thomson-Reuters 
(13F) Database 
OVLPII_TRA 
Overlapping institutional investors that are classified as 
"transient" in year t. 
Thomson-Reuters 
(13F) Database 
PIH 
Percentage of firm i’s total shares outstanding owned by 
institutional investors in December of year t. 
Thomson-Reuters 
(13F) Database 
NAN Number of sell-side analysts covering firm i in year t. IBES 
OVLPAN 
Number of unique sell-side analysts who issued a one-
year sales or earnings forecast during year t for both firm 
i in industry k and the first-mover in industry k, scaled 
by NAN. IBES 
OVLPAUD 
Indicator set to 1 if firm i in industry k and the first-
mover in industry k use the same audit firm from the 
same office location during year t, 0 otherwise. 10-K filings 
HEDGING 
Indicator set to 1 if firm i in year t uses derivatives for 
hedging purposes, 0 otherwise. 10-K filings 
TRADING 
Indicator set to 1 if firm i in year t uses derivatives for 
trading purposes, 0 otherwise. 10-K filings 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Name Definition Source of Data 
LMV 
Log of market value of equity, common shares 
outstanding times stock price, at fiscal year end. Compustat 
ROA 
Income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets at fiscal year end. Compustat 
DTE 
Long-term debt divided by market value of equity at 
fiscal year end. Compustat 
BTM 
Stockholder's equity divided by market value of equity 
at fiscal year end. Compustat 
SAR 
Raw return minus the capitalization-based decile return 
of the index. CRSP 
STOCKLIQ 
Average monthly trading volume divided by total 
shares outstanding. CRSP 
STOCKVOL 
Standard deviation of monthly size-adjusted returns 
(SARs). CRSP 
OILPRC Year-end spot price for a barrel of crude oil. 
U.S. Energy 
Information Admin. 
LNOILPRC Log of the year-end spot price for a barrel of crude oil. 
U.S. Energy 
Information Admin. 
OILVOL 
Standard deviation of monthly returns on oil prices for 
the year. 
U.S. Energy 
Information Admin. 
PRIMERATE Year-end prime rate. 
U.S. Federal 
Reserve 
PRIMERATEVOL 
Standard deviation of monthly prime rate changes for 
the year. 
U.S. Federal 
Reserve 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Selection and Distribution of the Dependent Variables 
 
Panel A: Composition of Sample Firms 
     Followers: Non-Followers: 
   Industry  Number of Number of 
   First-Movers:   firms that firms that 
   First firm to  subsequently subsequently 
   disclose multiple  disclosed never disclosed 
   quantitative  multiple multiple 
SIC Industry Name Firms formats Year formats formats 
1311 Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 43 Apache Corp. 1999 23 19 
2911 Petroleum Refining 10 Marathon Oil 2003 2 7 
6020 National Commercial Banks 30 Bank of America 1997 20 9 
6211 Security Brokers & Dealers 16 Morgan Stanley 1997 8 7 
6798 Real Estate Investment Trusts 54 HRPT Properties 1998 24 29 
  
Total 153     77 71 
 
Panel B: Transition Matrix 
 
 AFTER 
BEFORE None Tab. SA VAR Tab. & SA 
Tab. & 
VAR 
SA & 
VAR 
Tab., SA & 
VAR 
None 3 1     2   1 1 
Tabular   23 1   29       
Sensitivity Analysis   1 37 1 27   3   
Value-at-Risk       2   3 2   
Tabular & SA               5 
Tabular & VAR             
 
2 
SA & VAR             2 2 
Tabular, SA & VAR                 
Total Follower Firms 58 3 6 10 
 
Panel C: Distribution of Dependent Variable MULTIPLE=1 by Fiscal Year 
 
     % of Firms where 
Fiscal Year Sample Firms MULTIPLE=0 MULTIPLE=1 MULTIPLE=1 
1998                    44                        24                      20  45% 
1999                    97                        71                      26  27% 
2000                  138                      107                      31  22% 
2001                  138                        96                      42  30% 
2002                  138                        91                      47  34% 
2003                  138                        83                      55  40% 
2004                  146                        87                      59  40% 
2005                  135                        79                      56  41% 
2006                  127                        72                      55  43% 
2007                  119                        60                      59  50% 
Total Firm-Years               1,220                      770                    450  37% 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Sample Selection and Distribution of the Dependent Variables 
 
Panel D: Distribution of Dependent Variable INCREASE=1 by Fiscal Year 
 
     Distribution of 
Fiscal Year Sample Firms INCREASE=0 INCREASE=1 INCREASE=1 
1998                    35                        30                        5  6% 
1999                    83                        76                        7  9% 
2000                  115                      109                        6  8% 
2001                  112                        98                      14  18% 
2002                  105                        94                      11  14% 
2003                    96                        83                      13  17% 
2004                    94                        87                        7  9% 
2005                    86                        79                        7  9% 
2006                    74                        72                        2  3% 
2007                    65                        60                        5  6% 
Total Firm-Years                  865                      788                      77  100% 
 
Panel E: Distribution of INCREASE=1 by Industry and Event Year 
 
Event SIC 1311 SIC 2911 SIC 6020 SIC 6211 SIC 6798  % of 
Year Oil & Gas Oil Refining Banks Brokers REITs Total Total 
Year 1 2 0 5 0 2 9 12% 
Year 2 6 1 5 0 2 14 18% 
Year 3 3 0 1 1 4 9 12% 
Year 4 5 1 4 0 6 16 21% 
Year 5 4 0 1 1 4 10 13% 
Year 6 2 0 2 2 1 7 9% 
Year 7 0 0 1 1 0 2 3% 
Year 8 1 0 1 3 2 7 9% 
Year 9 0 0 0 0 3 3 4% 
Year 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Total 23 2 20 8 24 77 100% 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics about the sample firms and the two dependent variables 
(MULTIPLE and INCREASE) used in the logistic regressions of equations (1) and (2).  Panel A shows the 
five industries (by SIC) and the number of firms from each industry included in the sample.  Within each 
industry, a first-mover is identified as the first firm to include multiple quantitative formats in its market 
risk disclosure.  Also shown is the number of firms in each industry that eventually followed the industry 
first-mover’s decision to include multiple formats.  Panel B shows the formats disclosed by the potential 
follower firms in their initial and final sample years of their 10-K filing.  Panel C shows, by fiscal year, the 
number of firms that include multiple formats in its market risk disclosure. Panel D shows, by fiscal year, 
the number of firms that changed their market risk disclosure (relative to the prior year’s 10-K) to include 
more formats.  Panel E shows, by industry and event year (relative to the industry first-mover), the number 
of firms that changed their market risk disclosures to include more formats. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Levels Analysis (N=1,220) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
PIH 0.578 0.241 0.003 0.417 0.605 0.774 1.000 
NII 212.553 217.694 2.000 93.000 146.000 249.000 1,540.000 
OVLPII 0.705 0.166 0.258 0.576 0.740 0.839 1.000 
OVLPII_LARGE 0.547 0.147 0.160 0.442 0.553 0.663 1.000 
OVLPII_SMALL 0.158 0.124 0.000 0.069 0.111 0.217 0.601 
OVLPII_DED 0.024 0.016 0.000 0.015 0.021 0.029 0.182 
OVLPII_QIX 0.497 0.130 0.000 0.408 0.492 0.593 1.000 
OVLPII_TRA 0.163 0.064 0.000 0.116 0.167 0.210 0.500 
NAN 12.148 10.321 0.000 4.000 9.000 18.000 52.000 
OVLPAN 0.288 0.296 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.500 1.000 
OVLPAUD 0.047 0.211 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
HEDGING 0.853 0.354 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TRADING 0.181 0.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LMV 7.642 1.716 1.866 6.681 7.546 8.630 13.131 
ROA 0.036 0.052 -0.222 0.012 0.022 0.050 0.240 
DTE 0.677 0.772 0.000 0.183 0.489 0.877 4.771 
BTM 0.595 0.366 0.094 0.375 0.505 0.705 2.405 
SAR 0.106 0.461 -0.782 -0.171 0.048 0.287 2.111 
STOCKLIQ 0.114 0.084 0.011 0.059 0.090 0.144 0.460 
STOCKVOL 0.085 0.051 0.030 0.052 0.070 0.100 0.323 
OILPRC 41.993 21.859 11.350 28.440 32.130 59.410 91.690 
LNOILPRC 3.609 0.509 2.429 3.348 3.470 4.084 4.518 
OILVOL 0.073 0.009 0.059 0.066 0.070 0.079 0.090 
PRIMERATE 6.492 1.907 4.000 4.840 7.150 8.250 9.500 
PRIMERATEVOL 0.103 0.034 0.061 0.085 0.097 0.111 0.184 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Changes Analysis (N=865) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
∆PIH 0.031 0.098 -0.814 -0.014 0.023 0.070 0.608 
∆NII 16.628 31.739 -176.000 0.000 11.000 27.000 248.000 
∆OVLPII 0.011 0.068 -0.338 -0.024 0.010 0.044 0.500 
∆OVLPII_LARGE 0.007 0.072 -0.409 -0.030 0.004 0.043 0.550 
∆OVLPII_SMALL 0.004 0.042 -0.191 -0.016 0.003 0.025 0.250 
∆OVLPII_DED -0.001 0.017 -0.110 -0.008 -0.001 0.006 0.182 
∆OVLPII_QIX 0.002 0.070 -0.338 -0.030 0.001 0.034 0.750 
∆OVLPII_TRA 0.007 0.050 -0.250 -0.014 0.007 0.031 0.308 
∆NAN 0.653 3.299 -18.000 -1.000 1.000 2.000 17.000 
∆OVLPAN 0.005 0.188 -1.000 -0.038 0.000 0.057 1.000 
∆OVLPAUD -0.001 0.113 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
∆HEDGING 0.014 0.204 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
∆TRADING 0.001 0.076 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
∆LMV 0.147 0.443 -2.788 -0.067 0.142 0.336 3.514 
∆ROA 0.002 0.052 -0.241 -0.008 0.000 0.009 0.283 
∆DTE -0.032 0.578 -2.932 -0.130 0.000 0.100 2.547 
∆BTM -0.019 0.273 -1.014 -0.115 -0.017 0.078 0.999 
∆SAR -0.007 0.745 -2.393 -0.387 -0.033 0.336 2.252 
∆STOCKLIQ 0.014 0.047 -0.106 -0.007 0.008 0.027 0.233 
∆STOCKVOL -0.006 0.047 -0.168 -0.024 -0.005 0.016 0.147 
∆OILPRC 0.268 0.434 -0.381 0.043 0.343 0.480 1.300 
∆OILVOL 0.000 0.014 -0.031 -0.002 0.006 0.010 0.015 
∆PRIMERATE -0.179 1.937 -4.660 -0.590 0.750 1.100 2.000 
∆PRIMERATEVOL 0.002 0.048 -0.072 -0.031 0.015 0.036 0.078 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical tests for all firm-years.  Panel 
A shows the values of the variables measured in levels and Panel B shows the year-to-year changes in the 
variables.  Panel C shows pair-wise Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower diagonal) correlations 
for the variables measured in levels and Panel D shows correlations of the change variables.  All variable 
definitions are provided in Table 1.  Values for ROA, DTE, BTM, SAR, STOCKLIQ and STOCKVOL 
have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 70 
 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel C: Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower) Correlations of Variables in Levels Regressions (N=1,220) 
  OVLPII PIH OVLPAN OVLPAUD LMV ROA DTE BTM SAR STOCKLIQ STOCKVOL 
OVLPII   -0.35 0.25 0.09 0.00 -0.07 -0.18 -0.15 -0.05 0.03 0.11 
PIH -0.37   0.25 0.00 0.35 0.13 -0.02 -0.24 0.07 0.41 -0.27 
OVLPAN 0.25 0.26   0.21 0.43 0.13 -0.05 -0.17 0.08 0.33 0.02 
OVLPAUD 0.07 0.00 0.17   0.00 -0.04 0.18 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.12 
LMV 0.07 0.29 0.43 0.02   0.09 -0.14 -0.41 0.02 0.10 -0.44 
ROA -0.26 0.21 0.10 -0.04 -0.02   -0.35 -0.27 0.33 0.16 0.09 
DTE -0.37 0.10 -0.15 0.10 -0.05 -0.34   0.55 -0.17 0.02 0.09 
BTM -0.19 -0.15 -0.19 0.08 -0.36 -0.16 0.42   -0.26 -0.07 0.22 
SAR -0.12 0.14 0.07 -0.02 0.09 0.28 -0.15 -0.26   0.11 0.37 
STOCKLIQ -0.08 0.54 0.37 0.14 0.15 0.14 -0.03 -0.12 0.09   0.21 
STOCKVOL 0.03 -0.16 0.04 0.08 -0.42 0.15 -0.13 0.10 0.17 0.12   
 
Panel D: Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower) Correlations of Variables in Changes Regressions (N=865) 
  ∆OVLPII ∆PIH ∆OVLPAN ∆OVLPAUD ∆LMV ∆ROA ∆DTE ∆BTM ∆SAR ∆STOCKLIQ ∆STOCKVOL 
∆OVLPII   -0.16 0.09 0.14 -0.22 -0.14 0.15 0.14 -0.16 -0.08 0.02 
∆PIH -0.15   -0.07 -0.05 0.24 0.05 -0.16 -0.21 0.07 0.03 -0.06 
∆OVLPAN 0.02 -0.06   0.08 -0.07 -0.18 0.08 0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.09 
∆OVLPAUD 0.09 -0.07 0.06   -0.11 -0.11 0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.04 0.01 
∆LMV -0.25 0.23 -0.07 -0.06   0.27 -0.60 -0.74 0.54 0.24 0.14 
∆ROA -0.10 0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0.24   -0.21 -0.17 0.26 0.14 0.11 
∆DTE 0.19 -0.15 0.10 0.04 -0.64 -0.28   0.61 -0.36 -0.04 0.02 
∆BTM 0.15 -0.19 0.04 0.01 -0.75 -0.15 0.61   -0.49 -0.11 -0.10 
∆SAR -0.12 0.12 -0.05 -0.08 0.49 0.12 -0.37 -0.51   0.06 0.34 
∆STOCKLIQ -0.11 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.12 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01   0.39 
∆STOCKVOL 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.02 -0.09 0.20 0.31   
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TABLE 4 
Levels and Changes Analyses of Investor Overlap 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression of (MULTIPLEt=1) on Level of Investor Overlap OVLPIIt) 
 
 
 
 *, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A shows the results of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i includes multiple quantitative formats in its market risk disclosure for year t (MULTIPLEi,t). The 
variable of interest, OVLPIIi,t, is the number of overlapping institutional investors between firm i in 
industry k and the first-mover in industry k, scaled by the total number of institutional investors in firm i, 
both measured at December of year t.  The marginal effect column shows each variable’s mean marginal 
effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range (0 to 1 for indicator variables).  All other variable definitions 
are provided in Table 1. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  MULTIPLEt = 1 
Variable H1 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -2.287 0.049 ** -6.332 <.0001 ***   
OVLPIIt +      3.894 0.000 *** 0.178 
PIHt   -0.912 0.186   0.313 0.645   0.019 
OVLPANt   -0.042 0.931   -0.673 0.202   -0.059 
OVLPAUDt   -2.541 0.000 *** -2.485 0.000 *** -0.433 
HEDGINGt   0.357 0.355   0.474 0.173   0.083 
TRADINGt   0.913 0.043 ** 0.553 0.232   0.096 
LMVt   0.214 0.072 * 0.288 0.015 ** 0.098 
ROAt   -11.773 <.0001 *** -9.229 <.0001 *** -0.061 
DTEt   -0.127 0.570   0.068 0.721   0.008 
BTMt   -1.562 0.005 *** -1.097 0.036 ** -0.063 
SARt   -0.504 0.003 *** -0.384 0.022 ** -0.031 
STOCKLIQt   -2.753 0.152   -3.382 0.082 * -0.050 
STOCKVOLt   2.186 0.464   1.281 0.674   0.011 
LNOILPRCt   0.777 0.001 *** 0.644 0.010 ** 0.083 
OILSTDt   -7.187 0.372   -3.635 0.669   -0.008 
PRIMERATEt   -0.095 0.014 ** -0.089 0.037 ** -0.053 
PRIMERATEVOLt   0.602 0.768   0.554 0.801   0.003 
N  1,220    1,220      
Pseudo-R2   0.174     0.207       
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Levels and Changes Analyses of Investor Overlap 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression of (INCREASEt=1) on Prior Year Change in Investor 
Overlap (∆OVLPIIt-1) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  INCREASEt = 1 
Variable H1 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -2.520 <.0001 *** -2.607 <.0001 ***   
∆OVLPIIt-1 +      4.398 0.020 ** 0.023 
∆PIHt-1   -0.213 0.845   -0.121 0.916   -0.001 
∆OVLPANt-1   -0.102 0.894   -0.366 0.629   -0.003 
∆OVLPAUDt-1   -0.055 0.877   -0.190 0.585   0.000 
∆HEDGINGt-1   -0.249 0.695   -0.214 0.733   0.000 
∆TRADINGt-1   0.022 0.972   0.115 0.856   0.000 
∆LMVt-1   0.720 0.059 * 0.720 0.065 * 0.022 
∆ROAt-1   -2.970 0.286   -2.625 0.319   -0.004 
∆DTEt-1   0.568 0.002 *** 0.575 0.003 *** 0.010 
∆BTMt-1   -0.032 0.946   -0.088 0.868   -0.001 
∆SARt-1   0.206 0.347   0.212 0.354   0.012 
∆STOCKLIQt-1   1.148 0.723   1.443 0.665   0.004 
∆STOCKVOLt-1   4.115 0.161   2.950 0.290   0.009 
∆OILPRCt-1   -0.235 0.456   -0.346 0.270   -0.012 
∆OILSTDt-1   13.490 0.321   16.191 0.244   0.015 
∆PRIMERATEt-1   -0.204 0.041 ** -0.180 0.084 * -0.024 
∆PRIMERATEVOLt-1   -1.839 0.611   -2.266 0.532   -0.012 
N  865    865        
Pseudo-R2   0.040     0.054       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel B shows the results of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i increased its year t market risk disclosure from the prior year to include multiple quantitative 
formats (INCREASEi,t).  The variable of interest is ∆OVLPIIt-1, the prior year change in investor overlap.  
The marginal effect column shows each variable’s mean marginal effect multiplied by its inter-quartile 
range.  All other independent variables are lagged changes in the variables defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Levels and Changes Analyses of Investor Overlap 
 
Panel C: Regression of Next Year’s Change in Investor Overlap (∆OVLPIIt+1) on 
INCREASEt 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  ∆OVLPIIt+1 
Variable H1 Coeff. p-value 
Intercept   0.010 0.004 *** 
INCREASEt + 0.004 0.578   
∆PIHt   -0.054 0.057 * 
∆OVLPANt   -0.028 0.082 * 
∆OVLPAUDt   -0.027 0.176   
∆HEDGINGt   -0.005 0.514   
∆TRADINGt   -0.018 0.586   
∆LMVt   -0.001 0.958   
∆ROAt   0.004 0.962   
∆DTEt   -0.004 0.704   
∆BTMt   -0.003 0.891   
∆SARt   0.001 0.871   
∆STOCKLIQt   0.082 0.160   
∆STOCKVOLt   -0.015 0.886   
∆OILPRCt   -0.005 0.586   
∆OILVOLt   1.094 <.0001 *** 
∆PRIMERATEt   0.000 0.930   
∆PRIMERATEVOLt   0.261 0.000 *** 
N  790     
Adjusted-R2   0.033     
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel C shows the results of a multiple regression where the dependent variable is next year’s change in 
investor overlap (∆OVLPIIt+1).  The variable of interest is INCREASEi,t, an indicator of whether firm i 
increased its year t market risk disclosure from the prior year to include multiple quantitative formats.  All 
other independent variables are current year changes in the variables defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 5 
Analyses of Investor Overlap Partitioned By Large and Small Institutions 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression of (MULTIPLEt=1) on Level of Investor Overlap 
Partitioned by Large (OVLPII_LARGE) and Small (OVLPII_SMALL) Institutions 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  MULTIPLEt = 1 
Variable H2 Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -7.520 <.0001 ***   
OVLPII_LARGEt + 4.835 0.000 *** 0.186 
OVLPII_SMALLt   2.289 0.173   0.059 
PIHt   0.225 0.738   0.014 
OVLPANt   -0.636 0.227   -0.055 
OVLPAUDt   -2.473 <.0001 *** -0.429 
HEDGINGt   0.508 0.134   0.088 
TRADINGt   0.623 0.180   0.108 
LMVt   0.428 0.008 *** 0.145 
ROAt   -9.665 <.0001 *** -0.063 
DTEt   0.073 0.704   0.009 
BTMt   -1.003 0.058 * -0.057 
SARt   -0.401 0.017 ** -0.032 
STOCKLIQt   -3.349 0.083 * -0.049 
STOCKVOLt   1.434 0.636   0.012 
LNOILPRCt   0.605 0.016 ** 0.077 
OILSTDt   -4.463 0.604   -0.009 
PRIMERATEt   -0.082 0.060 * -0.049 
PRIMERATEVOLt   -0.023 0.992   0.000 
N   1,220        
Pseudo-R2   0.209       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A shows the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i includes multiple quantitative formats in its market risk disclosure for year t (MULTIPLEi,t). The 
independent variables of interest are OVLPII_LARGEi,t and OVLPII_SMALLi,t, defined as the number of 
overlapping large and small institutions, respectively, between firm i in industry k and the first-mover in 
industry k, scaled by the total number of institutional investors in firm i.  The marginal effect column 
shows each variable’s mean marginal effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range (0 to 1 for indicator 
variables).  All variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Analyses of Investor Overlap Partitioned By Large and Small Institutions 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression of (INCREASE=1) on Prior Year Change in Investor 
Overlap Partitioned by Large (∆OVLPII_LARGEt-1) and Small (∆OVLPII_SMALLt-1) 
Institutions 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  INCREASEt = 1 
Variable H2 Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -2.599 <.0001 ***   
∆OVLPII_LARGEt-1 + 4.585 0.027 ** 0.026 
∆OVLPII_SMALLt-1   3.848 0.204  0.012 
∆PIHt-1   -0.111 0.923  -0.001 
∆OVLPANt-1   -0.379 0.617  -0.003 
∆OVLPAUDt-1   -0.228 0.566  0.000 
∆HEDGINGt-1   -0.212 0.734  0.000 
∆TRADINGt-1   0.111 0.861  0.000 
∆LMVt-1   0.740 0.057 * 0.023 
∆ROAt-1   -2.654 0.320  -0.004 
∆DTEt-1   0.580 0.003 *** 0.010 
∆BTMt-1   -0.081 0.878  -0.001 
∆SARt-1   0.207 0.363  0.012 
∆STOCKLIQt-1   1.396 0.674  0.004 
∆STOCKVOLt-1   3.024 0.276  0.009 
∆OILPRCt-1   -0.373 0.253  -0.013 
∆OILSTDt-1   15.912 0.253  0.015 
∆PRIMERATEt-1   -0.175 0.089 * -0.023 
∆PRIMERATEVOLt-1   -2.510 0.495  -0.013 
N  865        
Pseudo-R2   0.055       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel B shows the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i increased its year t market risk disclosure from the prior year to include multiple quantitative 
formats (INCREASEi,t).  The variables of interest are ∆OVLPII_LARGEt-1 and ∆OVLPII_SMALLt-1, the 
prior year changes in overlapping large and small institutions, respectively.  The marginal effect column 
shows each variable’s mean marginal effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range.  All other independent 
variables are lagged changes in the variables defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 6 
Analyses of Investor Overlap Partitioned  
By Dedicated, Quasi-Indexer and Transient Institutions 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression of (MULTIPLEt=1) on Level of Investor Overlap Partitioned 
by Dedicated (OVLPII_DED), Quasi-Indexer (OVLPII_QIX) and Transient (OVLPII_TRA) 
Institutions 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  MULTIPLEt = 1 
Variable H3 Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -7.008 <.0001 ***   
OVLPII_DEDt   17.620 <.0001 *** 0.045 
OVLPII_QIXt + 2.876 0.018 ** 0.092 
OVLPII_TRAt + 5.300 0.007 *** 0.086 
PIHt   0.092 0.897   0.006 
OVLPANt   -0.720 0.179   -0.062 
OVLPAUDt   -2.526 0.000 *** -0.436 
HEDGINGt   0.459 0.185   0.079 
TRADINGt   0.546 0.252   0.094 
LMVt   0.336 0.006 *** 0.113 
ROAt   -9.871 <.0001 *** -0.064 
DTEt   0.048 0.811   0.006 
BTMt   -1.106 0.034 ** -0.063 
SARt   -0.448 0.009 *** -0.035 
STOCKLIQt   -3.094 0.107   -0.045 
STOCKVOLt   1.309 0.678   0.011 
LNOILPRCt   0.726 0.004 *** 0.092 
OILSTDt   -0.879 0.920   -0.002 
PRIMERATEt   -0.093 0.035 ** -0.055 
PRIMERATEVOLt   0.794 0.723   0.004 
N   1,220        
Pseudo-R2   0.212       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A shows the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i includes multiple quantitative formats in its market risk disclosure for year t (MULTIPLEi,t). The 
independent variables of interest are OVLPII_DEDi,t, OVLPII_QIXi,t, and OVLPII_TRAi,t, defined as the 
number of overlapping dedicated, quasi-indexer and transient institutions (Bushee 1998, 2001), 
respectively, between firm i in industry k and the first-mover in industry k, scaled by the total number of 
institutional investors in firm i.  All variables are measured at December of year t.  The marginal effect 
column shows each variable’s mean marginal effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range (0 to 1 for 
indicator variables).  All other variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
Analyses of Investor Overlap Partitioned  
By Dedicated, Quasi-Indexer and Transient Institutions 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression of (INCREASE=1) on Prior Year Change in Investor 
Overlap Partitioned by Dedicated (∆OVLPII_DEDt-1), Quasi-Indexer (∆OVLPII_QIXt-1) 
and Transient (∆OVLPII_TRAt-1) Institutions 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  INCREASEt = 1 
Variable H3 Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -2.569 <.0001 ***   
∆OVLPII_DEDt-1   8.347 0.229   0.009 
∆OVLPII_QIXt-1 + 3.656 0.039 ** 0.018 
∆OVLPII_TRAt-1 + 3.959 0.073 * 0.014 
∆PIHt-1   -0.173 0.878   -0.001 
∆OVLPANt-1   -0.319 0.678   -0.002 
∆OVLPAUDt-1   -0.307 0.426   0.000 
∆HEDGINGt-1   -0.251 0.693   0.000 
∆TRADINGt-1   0.164 0.798   0.000 
∆LMVt-1   0.679 0.090 * 0.021 
∆ROAt-1   -2.781 0.297   -0.004 
∆DTEt-1   0.579 0.002 *** 0.010 
∆BTMt-1   -0.221 0.687   -0.003 
∆SARt-1   0.203 0.373   0.011 
∆STOCKLIQt-1   1.889 0.574   0.005 
∆STOCKVOLt-1   2.859 0.329   0.009 
∆OILPRCt-1   -0.430 0.187   -0.015 
∆OILSTDt-1   18.778 0.184   0.018 
∆PRIMERATEt-1   -0.183 0.079 * -0.024 
∆PRIMERATEVOLt-1   -2.396 0.507   -0.013 
N  865        
Pseudo-R2   0.053       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel B shows the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i increased its year t market risk disclosure from the prior year to include multiple quantitative 
formats (INCREASEi,t).  The variables of interest are ∆OVLPII_DEDt-1, ∆OVLPII_QIXt-1 and 
∆OVLPII_TRAt-1, the prior year changes in overlapping dedicated, quasi-indexer and transient institutions 
(Bushee 1998, 2001), respectively.  The marginal effect column shows each variable’s mean marginal 
effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range.  All other independent variables are lagged changes in the 
variables defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 7 
Changes Analysis of Investor Overlap Interacted with Proxies for Uncertainty 
 
Logistic Regression of (INCREASE=1) on Prior Year Change in Investor Overlap 
(∆OVLPIIt-1) Interacted with Firms’ Idiosyncratic Stock Return and Volatility 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INCREASEt = 1 
Variable H4 Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -2.610 <.0001 ***   
∆OVLPIIt-1   3.018 0.109   0.016 
∆PIHt-1   -0.302 0.790   -0.002 
∆OVLPANt-1   -0.281 0.725   -0.002 
∆OVLPAUDt-1   -0.084 0.811   0.000 
∆HEDGINGt-1   -0.184 0.774   0.000 
∆TRADINGt-1   0.232 0.734   0.000 
∆LMVt-1   0.674 0.087 * 0.021 
∆ROAt-1   -2.238 0.392   -0.003 
∆DTEt-1   0.566 0.003 *** 0.010 
∆BTMt-1   -0.128 0.796   -0.002 
∆SARt-1   0.322 0.170   0.018 
∆STOCKLIQt-1   1.462 0.662   0.004 
∆STOCKVOLt-1   1.401 0.606   0.004 
∆OILPRCt-1   -0.396 0.221   -0.013 
∆OILSTDt-1   14.608 0.300   0.014 
∆PRIMERATEt-1   -0.163 0.118   -0.021 
∆PRIMERATEVOLt-1   -2.697 0.464   -0.014 
UNCERTt-1   -0.081 0.854   -0.006 
(∆OVLPIIt-1)*(UNCERTt-1) + 9.079 0.028 ** 0.047 
N   865        
Pseudo-R2   0.063       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i increased its year t market risk disclosure from the prior year to include multiple quantitative 
formats (INCREASEi,t).  The variable of interest is the interaction term.  The marginal effect column 
shows each variable’s mean marginal effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range.  All other variable 
definitions are provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 8 
Changes in Institutional Ownership Conditional on Disclosure Choice 
 
Test for Differences in Mean Change in the Number of Institutional Investors and Their 
Average Percentage Ownership 
 
  Quarter Prior to 10-K Quarter After 10-K Difference  
  Avg. # Avg. % shrs Avg. # Avg. % shrs Avg. # Avg. % shrs  
  N of Inst. Owned of Inst. Owned of Inst. Owned  
INCREASE=1 
     
77  
           
201.2  0.405% 
   
206.1  0.426%        4.9  0.021%  
INCREASE=0 
   
785  
           
181.0  0.434% 
   
185.8  0.437%        4.9  0.004%  
   Difference-in-Difference        0.0  0.017%  
   T-Test p-value   
             
0.088 * 
  
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Table 8 shows the results of a difference-in-difference test between firm-years in which a firm followed 
the industry first-mover (INCREASE=1) and firms-years in which the firm did not (INCREASE=0).  The 
pre-period is the most recent calendar quarter prior to a firm’s 10-K filing date and the post-period is the 
calendar quarter immediately after the filing date.  The test variables are: i) the change in the average 
number of institutional investors and ii) the change in the average percentage ownership of each 
institutional investor. 
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TABLE 9 
Examining the Potential Effect of Herding 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression of (MULTIPLEt=1) on (OVLPIIt) and (LPRIORt) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  MULTIPLEt = 1 
Variable H1 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -1.070 0.384   -4.387 0.006 ***   
LPRIORt   0.844 <.0001 *** 0.687 <.0001 *** 0.220 
OVLPIIt +      3.113 0.004 *** 0.138 
PIHt   -1.064 0.141   -0.074 0.920   -0.004 
OVLPANt   0.314 0.548   -0.263 0.631   -0.022 
OVLPAUDt   -2.257 0.002 *** -2.273 0.002 *** -0.383 
HEDGINGt   0.301 0.433   0.397 0.253   0.067 
TRADINGt   1.040 0.033 ** 0.737 0.144   0.124 
LMVt   0.179 0.124   0.236 0.050 ** 0.077 
ROAt   -8.359 0.000 *** -7.202 0.001 *** -0.046 
DTEt   -0.110 0.620   0.038 0.847   0.004 
BTMt   -1.241 0.020 ** -0.968 0.060 * -0.054 
ANNSARt   -0.549 0.002 *** -0.419 0.019 ** -0.032 
AVGMTURNt   -1.554 0.435   -2.093 0.298   -0.030 
STDMSARt   1.755 0.577   0.924 0.772   0.008 
LNOILPRCt   -0.452 0.214   -0.341 0.362   -0.042 
OILSTDt   -5.839 0.491   -3.033 0.728   -0.006 
PRIMERATEt   0.085 0.094 * 0.055 0.301   0.031 
PRIMERATESTDt   1.197 0.551   1.162 0.581   0.005 
N   1,220      1,220        
Pseudo-R2   0.210     0.229       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A shows the results of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i includes multiple quantitative formats in its market risk disclosure for year t (MULTIPLEi,t). The 
variable of interest, LPRIORi,t, is measured as the log of the number of firms in the same industry (as firm 
i) that have changed to multiple formats in a prior year.  The marginal effect column shows each variable’s 
mean marginal effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range (0 to 1 for indicator variables).  All other 
variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 9 (Continued) 
Examining the Potential Effect of Herding 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression of (INCREASE=1) on (∆OVLPIIt-1) and (LPRIORt) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  INCREASEt = 1 
Variable H1 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -2.957 <.0001 *** -3.189 <.0001 ***   
LPRIORt   0.213 0.125   0.275 0.055 * 0.040 
∆OVLPIIt-1 +      5.045 0.010 ** 0.026 
∆PIHt-1   -0.316 0.771   -0.252 0.824   -0.002 
∆OVLPANt-1   -0.077 0.924   -0.359 0.650   -0.003 
∆OVLPAUDt-1   -0.003 0.994   -0.129 0.710   0.000 
∆HEDGINGt-1   -0.200 0.738   -0.147 0.797   0.000 
∆TRADINGt-1   -0.072 0.906   -0.008 0.990   0.000 
∆LMVt-1   0.849 0.027 ** 0.904 0.020 ** 0.028 
∆ROAt-1   -2.485 0.380   -1.915 0.478   -0.003 
∆DTEt-1   0.624 0.001 *** 0.642 0.001 *** 0.011 
∆BTMt-1   0.094 0.849   0.075 0.889   0.001 
∆ANNSARt-1   0.203 0.353   0.205 0.366   0.011 
∆AVGMTURNt-1   0.628 0.849   0.682 0.842   0.002 
∆STDMSARt-1   4.801 0.118   3.734 0.200   0.011 
∆OILPRCt-1   -0.206 0.560   -0.322 0.370   -0.011 
∆OILSTDt-1   21.555 0.186   26.779 0.117   0.025 
∆PRIMERATEt-1   -0.236 0.025 ** -0.213 0.048 ** -0.028 
∆PRIMERATESTDt-1   0.065 0.988   0.072 0.986   0.000 
N  865    865        
Pseudo-R2   0.046     0.063       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel B shows the results of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i increased its year t market risk disclosure from the prior year to include multiple quantitative 
formats (INCREASEi,t).  The variable of interest, LPRIORi,t, is measured as the log of the number of firms 
in the same industry (as firm i) that have changed to multiple formats in a prior year.  The marginal effect 
column shows each variable’s mean marginal effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range.  All other 
independent variables are lagged changes in the variables defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 10 
Examining the Potential Influence of the Second-Movers 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression of (MULTIPLEt=1) on Level of Investor Overlap with the 
Industry First-Mover (OVLPIIt) and Second-Mover (OVLPII_SECt) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  MULTIPLEt = 1 
Variable H1 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -3.948 0.004 *** -7.173 <.0001 ***   
OVLPIIt +     3.478 0.002 *** 0.172 
OVLPII_SECt   1.224 0.029 ** 0.753 0.195   0.073 
PIHt   -0.167 0.820   0.533 0.476   0.036 
OVLPANt   -1.342 0.041 ** -0.486 0.454   -0.046 
HEDGINGt   0.637 0.094 * 0.617 0.074 * 0.116 
TRADINGt   0.762 0.140   0.316 0.557   0.059 
LMVt   0.212 0.127   0.204 0.133   0.075 
ROAt   -8.469 0.001 *** -8.137 0.001 *** -0.058 
DTEt   -0.242 0.287   -0.093 0.663   -0.012 
BTMt   -1.093 0.045 ** -0.861 0.103   -0.053 
ANNSARt   -0.469 0.020 ** -0.270 0.193   -0.023 
AVGMTURNt   -2.148 0.342   -3.051 0.201   -0.049 
STDMSARt   3.843 0.310   1.400 0.725   0.013 
LNOILPRCt   0.662 0.029 ** 0.571 0.076 * 0.079 
OILSTDt   0.093 0.991   8.565 0.323   0.020 
PRIMERATEt   -0.092 0.059 * -0.051 0.345   -0.032 
PRIMERATESTDt   -0.680 0.726   0.442 0.832   0.002 
N   1,001      1,001        
Pseudo-R2   0.145     0.169       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A shows the results of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i includes multiple quantitative formats in its market risk disclosure for year t (MULTIPLEi,t). The 
variable of interest, OVLPII_SECi,t, is the number of overlapping institutional investors between firm i in 
industry k and the second-mover in industry k, scaled by the total number of institutional investors in firm 
i, both measured at December of year t.  The marginal effect column shows each variable’s mean marginal 
effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range (0 to 1 for indicator variables).  All other variable definitions 
are provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
Examining the Potential Influence of the Second-Movers 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression of (INCREASE=1) on Prior Year Change in Investor 
Overlap with Industry First-Mover (∆OVLPIIt-1) and Second-Mover (∆OVLPII_SECt-1) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  INCREASEt = 1 
Variable H1 Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -2.462 <.0001 *** -2.500 <.0001 ***   
∆OVLPIIt-1 +      4.887 0.031 ** 0.027 
∆OVLPII_SECt-1   2.619 0.143   0.987 0.609   0.006 
∆PIHt-1   0.332 0.759   0.608 0.580   0.004 
∆OVLPANt-1   0.140 0.826   -0.024 0.970   0.000 
∆HEDGINGt-1   -0.150 0.795   -0.139 0.804   0.000 
∆TRADINGt-1   -0.731 0.284   -0.665 0.328   0.000 
∆LMVt-1   0.687 0.063 * 0.741 0.056 * 0.024 
∆ROAt-1   -2.553 0.336   -1.945 0.478   -0.003 
∆DTEt-1   0.631 0.008 *** 0.563 0.022 ** 0.011 
∆BTMt-1   0.316 0.524   0.399 0.474   0.006 
∆ANNSARt-1   0.135 0.522   0.140 0.525   0.008 
∆AVGMTURNt-1   2.405 0.527   1.920 0.621   0.005 
∆STDMSARt-1   4.482 0.181   4.256 0.197   0.014 
∆OILPRCt-1   -0.643 0.149   -0.704 0.118   -0.025 
∆OILSTDt-1   42.061 0.036 ** 41.574 0.033 ** 0.041 
∆PRIMERATEt-1   -0.285 0.031 ** -0.255 0.050 * -0.035 
∆PRIMERATESTDt-1   1.703 0.695   0.745 0.864   0.004 
N   687      687        
Pseudo-R2   0.062     0.076       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel B shows the results of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i increased its year t market risk disclosure from the prior year to include multiple quantitative 
formats (INCREASEi,t).  The variable of interest is ∆OVLPII_SECt-1, the prior year change in investor 
overlap with the industry second-mover.  The marginal effect column shows each variable’s mean 
marginal effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range.  All other independent variables are lagged changes 
in the variables defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 11 
Analyses of Investor Overlap Partitioned By Size and Type of Institution 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression of (MULTIPLEt=1) on Level of Investor Overlap 
Partitioned by Size and Type 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  MULTIPLEt = 1 
Variable Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept -7.675 <.0001 ***   
OVLPII_LARGE_DEDt 18.616 <.0001 *** 0.045 
OVLPII_SMALL_DEDt 10.711 0.465   0.007 
OVLPII_LARGE_QIXt 3.544 0.021 ** 0.096 
OVLPII_SMALL_QIXt 2.123 0.329   0.040 
OVLPII_LARGE_TRAt 6.220 0.017 ** 0.073 
OVLPII_SMALL_TRAt 2.166 0.613   0.016 
PIHt 0.046 0.948   0.003 
OVLPANt -0.688 0.201   -0.059 
OVLPAUDt -2.514 0.000 *** -0.434 
HEDGINGt 0.477 0.160   0.082 
TRADINGt 0.603 0.204   0.104 
LMVt 0.433 0.010 ** 0.146 
ROAt -10.057 <.0001 *** -0.066 
DTEt 0.051 0.800   0.006 
BTMt -1.018 0.057 * -0.058 
ANNSARt -0.444 0.009 *** -0.035 
AVGMTURNt -2.933 0.123   -0.043 
STDMSARt 1.262 0.693   0.011 
LNOILPRCt 0.657 0.009 *** 0.083 
OILSTDt -1.771 0.840   -0.004 
PRIMERATEt -0.086 0.073 * -0.051 
PRIMERATESTDt 0.277 0.899   0.001 
N 1,220        
Pseudo-R2 0.214       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A shows the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i includes multiple quantitative formats in its market risk disclosure for year t (MULTIPLEi,t). The 
independent variables of interest are overlapping institutional investors partitioned by both size and type: 
OVLPII_LARGE_DED, OVLPII_SMALL_DED, OVLPII_LARGE_QIX, OVLPII_SMALL_QIX, 
OVLPII_LARGE_TRA, and OVLPII_SMALL_TRA.  The marginal effect column shows each variable’s 
mean marginal effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range (0 to 1 for indicator variables).  All other 
variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 11 (Continued) 
Analyses of Investor Overlap Partitioned By Size and Type of Institution 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression of (INCREASEt=1) on Prior Year Change in Investor 
Overlap Partitioned by Size and Type 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  INCREASEt = 1 
Variable Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept -3.203 <.0001 ***   
∆OVLPII_LARGE_DEDt-1 11.174 0.093 * 0.010 
∆OVLPII_SMALL_DEDt-1 -5.577 0.784   0.000 
∆OVLPII_LARGE_QIXt-1 4.528 0.015 ** 0.019 
∆OVLPII_SMALL_QIXt-1 7.075 0.115   0.015 
∆OVLPII_LARGE_TRAt-1 5.578 0.056 * 0.014 
∆OVLPII_SMALL_TRAt-1 2.594 0.596   0.001 
∆PIHt-1 -0.306 0.786   -0.001 
∆OVLPANt-1 -0.400 0.616   -0.003 
∆OVLPAUDt-1 -0.332 0.444   0.000 
∆HEDGINGt-1 -0.211 0.716   0.000 
∆TRADINGt-1 -0.022 0.973   0.000 
∆LMVt-1 0.883 0.024 ** 0.022 
∆ROAt-1 -2.327 0.391   -0.004 
∆DTEt-1 0.683 0.001 *** 0.011 
∆BTMt-1 -0.143 0.800   -0.005 
∆ANNSARt-1 0.197 0.384   0.012 
∆AVGMTURNt-1 1.069 0.759   0.005 
∆STDMSARt-1 3.370 0.262   0.008 
∆OILPRCt-1 -0.384 0.327   -0.013 
∆OILSTDt-1 29.235 0.088 * 0.017 
∆PRIMERATEt-1 -0.231 0.035 ** -0.027 
∆PRIMERATESTDt-1 -0.390 0.926   -0.014 
N 865        
Pseudo-R2 0.065       
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel B shows the results of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if 
firm i increased its year t market risk disclosure from the prior year to include multiple quantitative 
formats (INCREASEi,t).  The independent variables of interest are the prior year change in overlapping 
institutional investors partitioned by both size and type: ∆OVLPII_LARGE_DED, 
∆OVLPII_SMALL_DED, ∆OVLPII_LARGE_QIX, ∆OVLPII_SMALL_QIX, ∆OVLPII_LARGE_TRA 
and ∆OVLPII_SMALL_TRA.  The marginal effect column shows each variable’s mean marginal effect 
multiplied by its inter-quartile range.  All other independent variables are lagged changes in the variables 
defined in Table 1. 
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TABLE 12 
Stock Return Sensitivities to an Industry Factor 
 
Panel A: Regression of Monthly Stock Returns on Returns of the Market and Oil Prices 
for Energy Firms 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  Rt 
Variable Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.021 <.0001 *** 
Rmt 0.548 <.0001 *** 
Rot 0.205 <.0001 *** 
Rot*MULTIPLEt -0.042 0.467   
N 4,224      
Adjusted-R2 0.051      
 
Panel B: Regression of Monthly Stock Returns on Returns of the Market and Interest 
Rate Changes for Financial Firms 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  Rt 
Variable Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.007 <.0001 *** 
Rmt 0.401 <.0001 *** 
∆Rft 0.054 0.004 *** 
∆Rft*MULTIPLEt -0.018 0.442   
N 10,367      
Adjusted-R2 0.072      
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A shows the results of regressing energy firms’ monthly stock returns (Ri,t) on the monthly returns 
of the CRSP equal-weighted index (Rmt), the monthly returns on oil prices (Rot), and the interaction of Rot 
with an indicator variable (MULTIPLEi,t) set to 1 (0 otherwise) for the months within a firm’s fiscal year 
that includes multiple quantitative formats in the 10-K.  Panel B shows the results of regressing financial, 
brokerage and REIT firms’ monthly stock returns on the monthly returns of the market index, the monthly 
percentage change in the 3-month Treasury Bill (∆Rft), and the interaction of ∆Rft with MULTIPLEi,t. 
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TABLE 13 
Analyses of Investor Overlap Using an Instrumental Variables Approach 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression of (MULTIPLEt=1) on Fitted Investor Overlap 
(OVLPII_HATt) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  MULTIPLEt = 1 
Variable H1 Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -7.631 <.0001 ***   
OVLPII_HATt + 4.868 0.010 *** 0.220 
PIHt   0.701 0.555   0.043 
OVLPANt   -0.920 0.327   -0.080 
OVLPAUDt   -2.661 0.037 ** -0.462 
HEDGINGt   0.548 0.336   0.095 
TRADINGt   0.537 0.480   0.093 
LMVt   0.296 0.129   0.100 
ROAt   -5.608 0.097 * -0.037 
DTEt   0.091 0.663   0.011 
BTMt   -0.852 0.287   -0.049 
ANNSARt   -0.424 0.105   -0.034 
AVGMTURNt   1.132 0.822   -0.054 
STDMSARt   -3.640 0.233   0.010 
LNOILPRCt   0.619 0.139   0.079 
OILSTDt   -0.574 0.968   -0.001 
PRIMERATEt   -0.084 0.231   -0.050 
PRIMERATESTDt   0.272 0.941   0.001 
N  1,220      
Pseudo-R2   0.209       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm and adjusted for the two-stage approach. 
 
Panel A shows the results of a two stage regression and are comparable to the results from Table 4 Panel 
A.  In the first stage, investor overlap (OVLPIIi,t) between firm i in industry k and the first-mover in 
industry k is regressed on differences in each firm’s idiosyncratic stock returns (DSAR), stock volatility 
(DSTOCKVOL) and share turnover (DSTOCKLIQ). The final instrumental variable is the ratio of equity 
fund flows for the year divided by total equity assets at the beginning of the year 
(EQFUNDFLOWS_CHG), based on data from the National Association of U.S. Investment Companies. 
Also included in the first stage regression are all the covariates from the second stage regression. In the 
second stage, the dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if firm i includes multiple quantitative 
formats in its market risk disclosure for year t (MULTIPLEi,t) and the fitted value of investor overlap 
(OVLPII_HAT) is substituted for actual investor overlap.  The marginal effect column shows each 
variable’s mean marginal effect multiplied by its inter-quartile range (0 to 1 for indicator variables).  All 
other variable definitions are provided in Table 1. 
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TABLE 13 (Continued) 
Analyses of Investor Overlap Using an Instrumental Variables Approach 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression of (INCREASEt=1) on Prior Year Change in Fitted 
Investor Overlap (∆OVLPII_HATt-1) 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INCREASEt = 1 
Variable H1 Coeff. p-value 
Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept   -2.495 <.0001 ***   
∆OVLPII_HATt-1 + 3.193 0.075 * 0.015 
∆PIHt-1   -0.369 0.723   -0.002 
∆OVLPANt-1   -0.172 0.826   -0.001 
∆OVLPAUDt-1   0.155 0.752   0.000 
∆HEDGINGt-1   -0.244 0.694   0.000 
∆TRADINGt-1   0.281 0.634   0.000 
∆LMVt-1   0.839 0.056 * 0.027 
∆ROAt-1   -1.006 0.645   -0.001 
∆DTEt-1   0.097 0.066 * 0.002 
∆BTMt-1   0.145 0.437   0.002 
∆ANNSARt-1   -0.058 0.694   -0.003 
∆AVGMTURNt-1   3.484 0.080 * -0.001 
∆STDMSARt-1   -0.403 0.789   0.011 
∆OILPRCt-1   -0.438 0.191   -0.015 
∆OILSTDt-1   17.136 0.199   0.017 
∆PRIMERATEt-1   -0.162 0.095 * -0.022 
∆PRIMERATESTDt-1   -1.533 0.663   -0.008 
N  865      
Pseudo-R2   0.030       
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors clustered by firm and adjusted for the two-stage approach. 
 
Panel B shows the results of a two stage regression and are comparable to the results from Table 4 Panel 
B. The dependent variable is set to 1 (0 otherwise) if firm i increased its year t market risk disclosure from 
the prior year to include multiple quantitative formats (INCREASEi,t). The variable of interest is 
∆OVLPII_HATt-1, the prior year change in fitted investor overlap.  All other independent variables are 
lagged changes in the variables defined in Table 1.  
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TABLE 14 
Hazard Model Estimation 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable: TIME 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
TIMEt 77 4.117 2.259 1.000 2.000 4.000 5.000 9.000 
 
Panel B: Hazard Rate Estimation of TIME on Prior Year Change in Investor Overlap 
(∆OVLPIIt-1) 
  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TIMEt 
Variable H1 Coeff. p-value 
∆OVLPIIt-1 + 4.950 0.050 * 
∆PIHt-1   -0.163 0.892   
∆OVLPANt-1   -0.307 0.663   
∆OVLPAUDt-1   -0.144 0.684   
∆HEDGINGt-1   0.060 0.916   
∆TRADINGt-1   -0.617 0.411   
∆LMVt-1   1.134 0.004 *** 
∆ROAt-1   0.005 0.999   
∆DTEt-1   0.618 0.005 *** 
∆BTMt-1   0.869 0.129   
∆SARt-1   0.138 0.593   
∆STOCKLIQt-1   -1.790 0.626   
∆STOCKVOLt-1   6.727 0.073 * 
∆OILPRCt-1   0.240 0.668   
∆OILSTDt-1   108.380 0.007 *** 
∆PRIMERATEt-1   -0.714 0.002 *** 
∆PRIMERATEVOLt-1   13.135 0.093 * 
N   865     
Pseudo-R2   0.118     
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-
tailed test and standard errors based on the robust sandwich covariance matrix of Lin and Wei (1989) that 
is robust to model mis-specification. 
 
Table 14 shows the results from a hazard model estimation where the dependent variable is the number of 
years (TIME) after an industry first-mover’s decision to include multiple formats in its market risk 
disclosure that it takes for firm i to also increase the number of formats in its market risk disclosure. If 
firm i never increases the number of formats, then the firm is considered a right-censored observation.  
Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, conditional on a firm not being right-
censored.  Panel B shows the results of the hazard model estimation.  The variable of interest is ∆OVLPIIt-
1, the prior year change in investor overlap.  All other independent variables are lagged changes in the 
variables defined in Table 1. 
 
